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We explore how changes in ownership and managerial control affect the 
productivity and profitability of producers. Using detailed operational, financial, 
and ownership data from the Japanese cotton spinning industry at the turn of the 
last century, we find a more nuanced picture than the straightforward “higher 
productivity buys lower productivity” story commonly appealed to in the 
literature. Acquired firms’ production facilities were not on average less 
physically productive than the plants of the acquiring firms before acquisition, 
conditional on operating. They were much less profitable, however, due to 
consistently higher inventory levels and lower capacity utilization—differences 
which reflected problems in managing the uncertainties of demand. When 
purchased by more profitable firms, these less profitable acquired plants saw 
drops in inventories and gains in capacity utilization that raised both their 
productivity and profitability levels, consistent with acquiring owner/managers 
spreading their better demand management abilities across the acquired capital. 
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The influence of changes in corporate control of assets on productivity has been a focus 
of theoretical and empirical research for some time.1  In principle, mergers and acquisitions can 
reallocate control of productive assets to entities that are able to apply them more efficiently. 
Besides increasing the productivity of the individual production units that are merged or acquired, 
a broader process of such reallocations can also lead to aggregate productivity growth. Such a 
mechanism therefore has the potential to explain patterns of productivity at both the micro and 
macro levels. Implicit in the story of this mechanism—though not often treated explicitly in the 
empirical work on the subject—is the notion that productivity growth occurs when changes in 
ownership and control put assets in more able managers’ hands.2
Despite the comfortable intuition of this logic, previous research has not been fully 
conclusive about the effects of ownership and management turnover, particularly regarding the 
nature of any measured productivity growth but especially regarding the particular manners in 
which this growth is obtained. This reflects in part the inherent limitations of the data available in 
the earlier studies. For instance, this research could not cleanly distinguish between physical 
(quantity) productivity and revenue productivity. This distinction can be important (Foster et al., 
2008). It is not particularly surprising, excepting bounded rationality or agency problems, that 
acquisition deals could yield expectedly profitable synergies. However, such between-firm 
synergies need not be tied to improvements in the efficiency with which producers convert inputs 
to outputs. For example, mergers or acquisitions may increase market power that leads to higher 
output prices for the merged firm. In the typical revenue-based productivity measures of the 
literature (separate price and quantity information is rarely available at the producer level), this 
would be reflected as a productivity gain even absent changes in technical efficiency. These and 
related measurement issues mean we are still limited in our knowledge of how turnover in asset 
ownership and management affects the level and growth of producers’ efficiency levels. 
 
In this paper, we seek to make progress on this front. A primary advantage of our effort is 
a data set that allows us to investigate the production and input allocation processes at an unusual 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987), McGuckin and Nguyen (1995), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008), and David 
(2012). 
2 The idea that managers or management practices—even independent of any considerations of ownership—shape 
differences in productivity across plants, firms, and even countries, is itself a focus of a separate, budding literature. 
Examples include Bloom and Van Reenen (2007 and 2010) and Bloom et. al (2013). 
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level of detail. We observe the operations, financial reports, management, and ownership of the 
universe of plants in a growing industry over the course of several decades (the Japanese cotton 
spinning industry at the open of the 20th Century). These data, which we describe in the next 
section, contain records in physical units of inputs employed and output produced at each plant 
in the years it operated as well as plant-specific output prices and wages and firm-level financial 
data. We have matched these production and financial data with business histories of the 
industry’s firms to let us identify all major ownership and/or management turnover events and 
the personalities involved. These combined data let us measure directly how ownership and 
management turnover events were reflected in plants’ physical productivity levels, profitabilities, 
prices, and other operational and financial metrics. 
Our findings draw a more nuanced picture of the effects of ownership and management 
turnover than the straightforward “higher productivity buys lower productivity” story that has 
motivated much of the previous theoretical and empirical work. In our sample, acquired firms’ 
production facilities were not on average any less physically productive than the plants of the 
acquiring firms before acquisition; both parties were equally adept at transforming physical 
inputs into physical outputs, at least conditional on operating. Acquired firms were much less 
profitable than acquiring firms, however. This profitability gap did not result from any output 
price differences between the firms. Instead, as we show, it reflected systematically lower unit 
capital costs among acquirers, coming from two sources: lower average inventory levels and 
systematically higher capacity utilization. When these better acquirers bought less profitable 
establishments, the acquired plants saw drops in inventories and gains in capacity utilization that 
raised both their productivity and profitability levels. The pre-acquisition equality in physical 
productivity between the acquired and the acquiring arose because, as we document below, 
acquired plants were newer and had more productive capital of younger vintages. This canceled 
out their capital utilization disadvantages in productivity terms. 
Therefore ownership/management turnover in the industry is best characterized as 
“higher profitability buys lower profitability.” More profitable companies took over firms with 
capital that was actually better, but that was being used suboptimally. The new management took 
control of this superior capital and, by improving the manner in which it was employed, raised 
the acquired plants’ productivity and profitability. 
As to the specific source of the better owners’ and managers’ advantage, the explanation 
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most consistent with the data is that better firms have a superior ability to manage the vagaries of 
demand in the industry. (We describe just what this means in our context in the next section.) 
This explanation is consistent not just with the productivity and profitability levels and changes 
we observe, but also with the differences in inventory levels and capacity utilization. This link 
between demand management, productivity, and profitability is to our knowledge a new 
mechanism in the literature examining how management can affect business performance. We 
present below a simple theoretical framework of managerial time allocation that offers one 
possible mechanism through which this demand management difference might operate. 
This ownership and management reallocation process helped drive considerable 
productivity growth in the industry. Between 1897 and 1915, industry TFP growth averaged an 
impressive 2.3 percent per year, while over 3/4 of industry capacity changed hands during our 
sample. And while acquirers were fairly concentrated—the asset reallocation process resulted in 
the emergence of several very large firms (we look more closely at these “serial acquirers” 
below)—what set the leading firms apart was not their market power (we show there was little 
during the sample) but rather the ability to acquire and fully utilize the most productive capital. 
While we focus our analysis on a single industry case study to take advantage of the 
available data and unique setting, we believe our setting offers broader lessons. The mechanisms 
we discover here could easily operate in other industries, countries, and time periods; they might 
just be difficult to isolate in standard datasets. Certainly, the structures of ownership control and 
the scope of managers to influence outcomes in our setting are very much like the structures and 
scope that exist today. Furthermore, the data span a time of critical economic development and 
industrialization for Japan, which at the time was less than two decades removed from the 
completion of a difficult and often violent process of transition to modernity after 250 years of an 
isolated, traditionalist society. Information as detailed as our data is unusual even for producers 
in today’s advanced countries, to say nothing of developing countries whose situation might be 
more similar to that of Japan at the time of our analysis. Hence, we believe that broader lessons 
regarding the development of an advanced industrial economy can be drawn from this study. By 
digging deep into the micro-evidence, we aim to complement past empirical work and provide 
fresh insights for further development of economic theory about resource reallocation. 
 
2. Entry and Acquisitions in the Japanese Cotton Spinning Industry: Background Facts 
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The development of the Japanese cotton spinning industry in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries has long fascinated economists because of its unique nature “as the only significant 
Asian instance of successful assimilation of modern manufacturing techniques” before World 
War II (Saxonhouse, 1971; 1974).3
[Figure 1 about here] 
 The historical circumstances surrounding this development 
made the story even more intriguing. Japan unexpectedly opened up to foreign trade in the 1860s 
after 250 years of autarky. Cotton yarn, in particular, experienced the combination of the largest 
fall in relative price from autarky to the free trade regime and the highest negative net exports 
(Bernhofen and Brown, 2004). But starting from the late 1880s, the domestic cotton spinning 
industry began a remarkable ascendance. Net exports turned positive for the first time in late 
1896, and two decades after that Japan was exporting a sizeable fraction of its output while 
imports became negligible (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 reveals that the development went through several stages. During the first stage, 
Japanese knowledge of the technology was rudimentary, and as a result spinning mills were 
small and had low productivity. In 1887, the industry included 21 firms, but the average 
equipment capacity was just 3,292 spindles and the average number of factory floor workers 
employed per day was 137. 
The second stage, involving the explosive growth of the 1890s, was ushered in by two 
major technological breakthroughs: the switch to imported raw cotton, and the adoption of a 
newer type of cotton spinning machinery. By 1896, the total number of active firms in the 
industry had reached 63 (with 17 more in the process of being set up), with the average plant 
having a capacity of 12,789 spindles and employing 719 workers. Thus the number of firms 
tripled over the first decade of growth, average plant size almost quadrupled, and average 
employment per plant rose fivefold. Industry output in physical units increased 17 fold over 
during the same period (Nihon Choki Tokei Soran, Vol. 2, pp. 346). 
Industry entrants of earlier cohorts that set up their production facilities before the major 
innovations of the 1890s found themselves stuck with older vintage machines. However, an 
important advantage some of them had developed by the time the technological breakthroughs 
happened was a superior ability to “manage sales.” Since this will play an important role in 
                                                 
3  To save some space, we present here a “bare-bones” sketch of these facts. More details can be found in 
Saxonhouse (1974). See also Ohyama, Braguinsky, and Murphy (2004) and Braguinsky and Rose (2009). 
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mergers and acquisitions analysis below, we dwell upon this in some detail here. 
Japanese cotton spinners at the time generally faced a very competitive market (see, e.g., 
Saxonhouse, 1971 and 1977). Most of the yarn was purchased and distributed by trading houses 
based in the largest commercial centers of Osaka and Tokyo (Takamura, 1971, Vol. 1, pp. 322-
328). The market power of even the largest cotton spinning firms was on par or below that of 
trading houses, so no producer could exercise much influence over the price at which its yarn 
was being sold (ibid., p. 325).4
This superior ability to manage sales may not have been crucial during the rapid 
expansion phase, but we show in Section 4 that it started playing a major role in firms’ fortunes 
when the industry’s development entered its third stage at the start of the 20th century. After 
driving out imports, the Japanese cotton spinning industry felt the limits of the market size for 
the first time. Once the Boxer Rebellion effectively shut down the Chinese market in 1900, the 
first major “overproduction crisis” in the industry was in full swing. Most of the following 
decade saw industry consolidation with little if any growth on the extensive margin but with a lot 
of firm-by-firm (and firm-by-outside investor) acquisitions of existing production facilities, the 
first one of which happened in 1898. 
 This does not mean, however, that the playing ground was equal 
for all firms. Especially during anticipated business downturns, large established trading houses 
often applied rationing, in which they would limit their purchases to reputable producers with 
whom they had a long-term relationship (Takamura, 1971, Vol. 2). Going outside of the network 
of reputable trading houses entailed risks of its own, as unscrupulous traders could renege on 
contracts or their promissory notes could bounce, failing to deliver real cash. We will see below 
that these problems were indeed quite severe, and that the most successful early entrants (who 
later became major acquirers in the mergers and acquisition market) managed these sales-related 
issues better than other firms early on. 
Figure 2 depicts the total capacity of several categories of plants from 1896-1920, our 
merger and acquisition analysis timeframe. During the first decade of the 20th century especially, 
almost all capacity growth among existing firms came through acquisitions. While entry and new 
                                                 
4 Cotton yarn was also traded on the Osaka exchange. The gross transaction volume on the exchange was very 
large—sometimes several times larger than the amount of output—and the prices set there strongly influenced the 
prices trading houses were willing to pay even in seemingly isolated local markets (ibid., p. 327). Cotton spinning 
firms did take collective action to support prices by enacting output restriction measures during slow years. By their 
nature, however, these restrictions affected all firms uniformly and they were enforced by on-site inspections 
conducted by the All-Japan Cotton Spinners Association.  
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construction eventually resumed, acquisitions continued to play an important role.5
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
The fact that acquisitions assumed such a prominent role in firm growth process so early 
on also seems at first glance to be at odds with the established theoretical view that investment 
by purchasing new capital should come before acquisitions (e.g., Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002, 
who find support for the theory in U.S. data). However, the intuition behind the underlying 
theory is simply that new capital purchases do not involve fixed costs, while acquisitions do. 
This was less true in the early Japanese spinning industry. Because the industry had to import 
almost all its capital equipment from England at considerable financial and time costs, taking 
over existing plants at the right price was a potentially cheaper way for Japanese firms to expand. 
These factors led to the consummation of 73 distinct acquisition deals involving 95 plants 
(some changed hands more than once) between 1898 and 1920. Fifteen more plants were 
consolidated under a single ownership in the deal that in 1914 created Toyo Cotton Spinning 
Company (Toyobo) from an equal merger of Osaka Cotton Spinning Company (Osaka Boseki) 
and Mie Cotton Spinning Company (Mie Boseki). All in all, 50 of the 78 plants (64 percent of 
plants and 76 percent of capacity) that were in operation in the industry in 1897, the year before 
the first acquisition took place, were subsequently acquired by another company at least once. 
Several large firms emerged from this process, mostly through serial acquisitions. These 
were Kanegafuchi Cotton Spinning Company (Kanebo), Mie Boseki, Osaka Boseki (as already 
mentioned, the latter two competed an equal merger in 1914 to form Toyobo), Settsu Cotton 
Spinning Company (Settsu Boseki) and Amagasaki Cotton Spinning Company (Amabo; the 
latter two merged in 1918 to form Dainippon Boseki).6
                                                 
5 A lack of trust outside immediate family members who operate the business can make it difficult for superior firms 
in today’s developing countries to increase their spans of control through acquisitions (Bloom, Sadun and Van 
Reenen, 2012). The Japanese cotton spinning industry avoided this problem because the large majority of its firms 
were set up and run as joint stock companies with easily transferable ownership. In Appendix B we present an 
example where a new CEO turned around a struggling firm by implementing a set of measures whose description 
reads amazingly similar to the script laid out by outside consultants for Indian firms in Bloom et al. (2013). How a 
functioning market for assets emerged so early in the process of economic modernization is a subject for a separate 
study; see Miwa and Ramseyer (2000) for some insights on this issue. 
 These five firms (which shrank to four 
after the 1914 merger and to three after the 1918 merger) went from owning 10 percent of the 
plants and 25 percent of industry capacity and output to 40 percent of plants and half of capacity 
and output over the 25-year period of our analysis (see also Figure A1 in Appendix C). This 
6 All these firms were founded before the technological breakthroughs of the early 1890s. Mie Boseki was founded 
in 1880, Osaka Boseki in 1882, Kanebo in 1887, while Settsu Boseki and Amabo were both founded in 1889.  
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concentration of ownership could in principle be due to multiple factors, but as our empirical 
analysis below will show, it appears to be mostly due to their superior ability to manage sales and 
as a consequence improve the productivity and profitability of the plants they acquired. 
 
3. Data 
Our main data source is the plant-level data gathered on the annual basis by governments 
of various Japanese prefectures and available in historical prefectural statistical yearbooks.7 For 
this paper, we have collected and processed all the available data between 1899 and 1920. Since 
the first acquisition of an operating plant in the industry happened in 1898, we added similar data 
for 1896-1898 using the annualized monthly data published in the “Geppo” bulletin of the All-
Japan Cotton Spinners’ Association. Our data thus cover 1896 to 1920. Saxonhouse (1971, p. 41) 
declares that “the accuracy of these published numbers is unquestioned.”8
Our data contain inputs used and output produced by each plant in a given year in 
physical units. In particular, the data contain the number of days the plant operated, the average 
daily numbers of spindles in operation, and of factory floor workers (male and female separately), 
average daily wages for each gender, data on intermediate inputs such as the consumption of raw 
cotton, output of the finished product (cotton yarn) in physical units and its average count, and 
the average price per unit of yarn produced.
 
9
We match these plant-level data with financial data from semi-annual reports issued by 
the firms that owned the plants. Those reports, which we were the first to systematically digitize, 
contain detailed balance sheets and profit-loss statements as well as lists of all shareholders (with 
the number of shares they held) and executive board members. Some firm-level financial data 
were also published in the semi-annual publication “Reference on Cotton Spinning” (“Menshi 
Boseki Jijo Sankosho”) which started in 1903. We use these data to supplement company reports 
 We observe which firm owns each plant at a given 
time, so we can see plant-level variables before and after ownership changes. 
                                                 
7 Here we describe only the most important features of our data; a more detailed description is in Appendix A. 
8 We checked anyway.  We found occasional, unsystematic coding errors as well as obvious typos, which we could 
often correct by comparing them with annualized monthly data from Geppo. In the vast majority of cases, however, 
the annual data in statistical yearbooks and the annualized monthly data did correspond very closely (any 
discrepancies were only a few percentage points). We dropped about 5 percent of observations where the annual data 
contained in government statistical reports could not be corrected. 
9 See Foster et al. (2008) and Syverson (2011) for the discussion of the importance of separating quantity and 
revenue productivity and the difficulties encountered when using conventional data containing sales and input 
expenditures but not inputs and output quantities.  Atalay (forthcoming) similarly discusses the importance of 
separating quantities from expenditures when measuring inputs. 
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for privately held firms and in cases where company reports were missing.10
Several unique properties of our research variables need to be explained in some detail. 
First, cotton yarn is a relatively homogeneous product, but it still comes in varying degree of 
fineness, called “count.”
 
11 To make different counts comparable for the purpose of productivity 
analysis, we converted various counts to the standard 20 count using a procedure detailed in 
Appendix A. Second, we used plant-year-specific female-to-male wage ratios to convert units of 
female labor to units of male labor.12
 
 Third, in addition to the number of spindles installed, we 
also have data on the actual number of spindles in operation for each plant-year. In other words, 
the data offer us the unusual ability to directly measure the flow of capital services at the plant 
level rather than to infer it from capital stocks or through the use of other proxies like energy use. 
This also allows us to measure capacity utilization rates. Finally, we follow Saxonhouse (1971 
and 1977) and exclude intermediate inputs (raw cotton) when estimating the production function.  
As discussed by Saxonhouse, yarn production is essentially Leontief in raw cotton when input 
and output are measured in units of weight (the raw correlation between the two variables in our 
data is 0.95). As a practical matter, including raw cotton in a log-linear production function thus 
renders all other inputs economically and statistically insignificant. One can interpret our 
production function estimates as relating yarn output to capital and labor flow inputs, 
conditioning on the use of the physically necessary quantity of raw cotton. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
Table A1 in Appendix C presents year-by-year counts of acquired plants during our 
sample. On average, 4.3 percent of the industry’s mills were acquired per year, with the afore-
mentioned serial acquirers responsible for about 40 percent of all acquisitions. 13
                                                 
10 We checked the correspondence between the data in Sankosho and company reports whenever both sources were 
available and found a 100 percent match. 
 These 
acquisition episodes form the base of our estimation sample. 
11 The yarn count expresses the thickness of the yarn, and its number indicates the length of yarn relative to the 
weight. The higher the count, the more yards are contained in a pound of yarn. Thus higher-count yarn is thinner 
(finer) than lower-count yarn. 
12  Using female-to-male wage ratios to aggregate the labor input assumes that wages reflect the marginal 
productivity of each gender. All our estimates are robust to including the number of male and female workers 
separately in the production function estimations. 
13 This average acquisition rate is higher than the 3.9 percent acquisition rate for large U.S. manufacturing plants 
over 1974-1992 reported in Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) or the 2.7 percent in the LED plant sample from 1972-
1981 used by Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987, Table 3). 
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4.1. Differences between Acquirers and Targets 
We first use our detailed data to see, before there were any acquisitions in the industry, if 
there were systematic differences among firms that would eventually a) acquire other firms, b) be 
acquired, and c) exit without either acquiring or being acquired.14 We compare these firms’ 
plants along several dimensions: physical (quantity-based) productivity, accounting profitability, 
average output price, the number of days of the year the plant is operational, the average age of 
the plant’s spindles, and the firm’s age. To measure plants’ physical total factor productivity 
levels (henceforth TFPQ, for quantity-based TFP), we estimate a Cobb-Douglas production 
function using the available data on all plants’ output in physical units, labor and capital service 
flows, year dummies, and the plant’s change in capacity from the previous year (as a control for 
possible adverse effects on output of adjustment costs of installing new equipment). The 
residuals from this production function reflect plants’ TFPQ levels relative to the industry-year 
average.15 To measure profitability, we calculate shareholders’ return on equity; that is, we divide 
firms’ profits by the amount of equity capital paid in by shareholders. 16  Equipment age is 
calculated as the current year minus the equipment vintage year, where vintage year reflects the 
composition of the years the plant’s machines were purchased. Firm age, on the other hand, is 
always equal to the calendar year minus the year the firm was founded.17
Table 1 shows means and standard deviations of the aforementioned plant characteristics 
for each group of firms. We further separate plants of future target firms into those that started 
 
                                                 
14 There were also a few surviving firms that did not participate in the acquisition market during our sample.  
15 Note, once again, that because we can measure capital service flows separately from capital stocks, a luxury 
typically unavailable in producer microdata, we can compute productivity either inclusive or exclusive of capacity 
utilization. (The former uses capital stocks as inputs. The latter uses capital service flows.) As will become clear 
below, the distinction between these is informative to explaining outcomes, so we compute TFPQ here using capital 
service flows, effectively measuring the plant’s productivity conditional on it operating. We calculate capacity 
utilization—how often the plant actually operates during the year—separately and explore the two metrics jointly in 
our analysis. We also show below that our results are robust to alternative production function estimation methods. 
16 We do not have firm balance sheets data for 1896-97, but we do have these for subsequent years, so we will also 
measure profitability as return on total capital employed. See below. 
17 For example, if the plant’s initially installed machines were purchased in year t and then the plant underwent an 
expansion during which the same quantity of new machines were purchased in year t+k, equipment age is calculated 
as the calendar year minus t until the year new machines are installed, after which it becomes the calendar year 
minus [t+(t+k)]/2, the average vintage age of machines (or the weighted average if the number of spindles installed 
later were different from the number initially installed). As the plant’s capital stock includes also buildings and 
various elements of infrastructure, equipment (spindles) age adjusted for vintage this way makes the plants look 
younger than they actually are. Firm age, on the other hand, certainly makes those plants that had added new 
spindles (or scrapped old ones, which is also captured in our measurement) look older than they are. Equipment age 
thus provides the lower bound, and the firm age the upper bound, for the true overall plant age. 
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operating before 1892 (labeled “first cohort”) and those that started operating in 1892 or later 
(“second cohort”), as the former are more likely to have older-vintage capital. The table includes 
only data from 1896-97—that is, before any acquisitions took place in the industry. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Looking across the table’s top row to compare the average physical productivity levels 
across the groups of plants, we see that plants in future acquiring firms—at least conditional on 
the plant operating—are not more physically efficient than those in future acquired firms. Indeed, 
the most efficient group of plants is the second cohort of the acquired. (On the other hand, the 
ubiquitous result in the literature that exiting plants are less productive than continuing 
establishments is borne out in our data.) 
This pattern is reversed when we look at profitability. The most profitable establishments 
(significantly so) are those in firms that will be acquirers. Plants in the first cohort of target firms 
are the second most profitable, and exiting and second-cohort acquired plants follow up the rear. 
The numbers in the table’s third row indicate these profitability gaps are not tied to 
differences in the prices the plants fetch for their output. All firms earn more or less similar price 
per unit weight of output. (Acquiring plants’ average price is slightly higher, though none of the 
differences in the table are statistically significant at conventional levels. Furthermore, when we 
adjust for the average count of the plants’ yarn, these differences become even smaller.) This 
result, which we will see repeatedly below, supports what we know about the institutions of the 
industry’s output market: pricing did not reflect large market power differences across industry 
producers and is unlikely to contribute to firm- or plant-level outcomes examined in this paper. 
The days-in-operation and age comparisons at the bottom of the table offer insight into 
the possible sources of the productivity and profitability patterns. Second-cohort acquired plants 
are more productive than other plants, yet less profitable. Their productivity advantage is tied to 
the fact that they have significantly newer capital (whether measured by equipment or firm age), 
as reflected in the table’s final rows.18
                                                 
18 In Appendix D, we use additional data on firms’ orders of specific pieces of capital equipment to measure how the 
machines’ technical specifications evolved over time. We find clear evidence of pre- and post-early 1890s 
differences (not sensitive to the choice of a specific cutoff year around this general timeframe) in technological 
capabilities along multiple dimensions: spindle rotation speed, spindles per frame, the yarn quality for which the 
machines are calibrated, and the ability to handle multiple yarn counts and cotton types. 
 A hint at why their productivity advantage did not yield a 
profitability advantage can be seen in the comparison of plants’ average days in operation. 
Second-cohort acquired plants only operated about 80 percent of the time that plants in future 
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acquiring firms did. Plants that were to exit the industry had the worst of both worlds: their 
capital was old (not only were they the oldest firms, their equipment and firm ages were almost 
the same, indicating they did almost no upgrading of their equipment), and their factories were 
often idle. They were unproductive and unprofitable as a result. 
 
4.2 Changes in Productivity and Profitability within Acquired Plants  
The analysis in the previous subsection revealed some systematic pre-acquisition 
differences between acquiring and target firms. In this subsection, we investigate whether and 
how acquired plants’ attributes change when they are taken over by acquiring firms. 
 Acquisition is, of course, not an exogenous occurrence.  As is typical in this literature, we 
do not have a source of random or even quasi-random assignment to acquisition, so interpreting 
any of the plant performance changes around acquisition as isolating causal effects should be 
done with caution. However, our specifications control for the most obvious sources of potential 
biases by controlling for acquired plant fixed effects (removing any effects of selection into 
acquisition on persistent plant attributes) and any common movements with various control 
groups (the acquiring firms’ existing plants, for example). We are relying for causal inference in 
part on the assumption that the causal effect of acquisition creates a discrete change in attributes 
surrounding the event, whereas any performance trends that might lead to selection into 
acquisition would be either common to the control plants (and thus partialled out in our control 
group specifications) or gradual enough to be distinguished from the more discrete direct effect.  
To that end, we show in Appendix K that there are no obvious pre-trends in acquired plants’ 
relative performance, while at the same time there is a noticeable change in the trajectory of 
certain performance measures at the time of acquisition.  
To measure the changes in acquired plants’ attributes, we estimate specifications that 
regress these attributes on three sets of time dummies defined around each acquisition event: a 
“late pre-acquisition” dummy that equals 1 for the two years immediately preceding the 
acquisition and zero otherwise, an “early post-acquisition” dummy that equals 1 for the first 
three years after the acquisition and zero otherwise, and a “late post-acquisition” dummy that 
equals 1 for all subsequent post-acquisition years after the first three and zero otherwise. The 
omitted category therefore includes the period at least three years prior to the acquisition. (We 
exclude the acquisition year itself from the regression because acquisitions often happen mid-
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year, making it hard to attribute outcomes solely to the acquirer or the acquired.) We include 
plant fixed effects in the specifications, so the coefficients on the time dummies reflect within-
plant changes in attributes. We also include calendar year fixed effects to remove any systematic 
changes in attributes over the sample and acquisition fixed effects (which are absorbed in plant 
fixed effects for the majority of plants that were acquired only once, but allow us to control for 
possible differences in circumstances of acquisition events for plants acquired multiple times). 
Thus our estimating equations have the general form: 
0 1 2 3it it it it i A t ity lbA eaA laA mα β β β η µ ε= + + + + + + + ,         (1) 
where yit is the attribute of plant i in year t; lbAit is the “late before acquisition” dummy; eaAit is 
the “early after acquisition” dummy; laAit is the “late after acquisition” dummy; ηi is a plant 
fixed effect; mA is an acquisition episode fixed effect; µt is a year fixed effect; and εit is the error 
term. 
 The first numerical column of Table 2 shows the results for TFPQ. Rather than first 
estimate physical TFP with a production function regression and then use the residual as the left-
hand-side variable in (1), we perform the equivalent one-step estimation by using the plant’s 
logged output as the dependent variable and adding the explanatory variables from the 
production function to the right hand side of (1): the plant’s logged number of composite worker-
days (the sum of male and female workdays, weighted by the relative plant-level ratio of female 
to male wages), its spindle-days in operation (flow of capital services), and the change in log 
plant capacity from the prior year (to control for any equipment installation adjustment costs). 
 [Table 2 around here] 
The results indicate that in the first 3 years after acquisition, acquired plants’ TFPQ levels 
are about 4 percent higher but not statistically different from their levels in the pre-acquisition 
years. In subsequent years, however, the TFPQ of acquired plants rises more than 13 percent 
above their pre-acquisition baseline, and we can reject equality of the early and late post-
acquisition dummies at the 1 percent level. Thus acquired plants’ TFPQ levels do improve 
considerably following an acquisition, although it takes time for this to manifest itself fully. We 
have also estimated a regression similar to (1) with the full set of pre- and post-acquisition year 
dummies and confirmed that there is no discernible pre-acquisition trend in TFPQ, while there is 
a clear upward trend after acquisitions, becoming particularly pronounced after the first 3 post-
acquisition years (see Appendix K). 
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Table 2’s second column looks at acquired plants’ profitability around acquisition 
episodes. Unfortunately, we cannot directly evaluate plant-level changes in profitability that are 
analogous to the cross sectional comparisons in Table 1, for the obvious reason that there are no 
separate post-acquisition firm profit accounts. We work around this issue by constructing a 
measure of plant-level net operating surplus, computed as the difference between the net value of 
cotton yarn produced by the plant and plant labor and capital costs (see Appendix E for details). 
We then divide this by the sum of shareholders’ capital (equity and retained earnings) and 
interest-bearing debt, which in case of multiple plant firms is assigned to each plant in proportion 
to the plant’s installed capacity (number of spindles). We call the resulting measure “plant-level 
return on capital employed”—“plant ROCE” for short—and we use this measure (winsorized at 
the top 2.5 percent) to compare plant-level profitability before and after acquisition periods.19
The ROCE of acquired plants increases in the first 3 years after acquisition by an average 
of about 4.5 percent, a difference from the excluded pre-acquisition period that is significant at 
the 10 percent level. ROCE rises further in subsequent years, to a long-run gain of over 7 percent. 
Hence, both the onset and share of long-run gains in profitability appear earlier than for TFPQ. 
 
Finally, to see if changes in plant-specific prices contributed to profitability changes, we 
estimate (1) using as the dependent variable the (logged) plant-specific price, divided by the 
main count of yarn produced by the plant to adjust for quality differences. The results, in Table 
2’s third column, indicate that post-acquisition prices are statistically and economically 
indistinguishable from pre-acquisition prices. Thus again the source of improved profitability 
over and above TFPQ improvement is not related to plants charging higher prices. 
We also tested whether these changes within acquired plants are systematically related to 
the attributes of the acquiring firm. While acquiring firms could be demarcated along a number 
of dimensions, a natural one is whether they were one of the “serial acquirers” we discussed in 
Section 2. Thus we repeated the specifications in estimation equation (1), but while limiting the 
sample to only acquisitions by one of the five serial acquirer firms. The results are in last 3 
columns in Table 2. Qualitatively, the patterns are similar, but more pronounced. In particular, 
acquisitions by serial acquirers correspond to long run improvements in acquired plants’ physical 
                                                 
19 As shown in Appendix E, our constructed plant ROCE is highly correlated with firm-level ROCE data in years 
preceding acquisition events (that is, when we have independent accounting data on both acquired and acquiring 
firms). The raw correlation between the two measures is about 0.74, and with the exception of extreme tails, the 
overall distribution fit is quite good too (see Figure A.2 in Appendix E). 
 15 
TFPQ of more than 24 percent (e0.217= 1.242), while ROCE increases by almost 15 percentage 
points. The point estimates on the price changes are larger than for all acquisitions, but t-tests fail 
to reject at conventional confidence levels the hypothesis that the coefficients on either of the 
post-acquisition dummies are equal to the pre-acquisition dummy coefficient. 
Overall, the within-plant results in Tables 3 indicate that acquired plants see growth in 
both their TFPQ and profitability levels after acquisition, though profitability growth occurs 
sooner. Moreover, both of these changes are larger for plants that are acquired by the most 
prolific of acquiring firms. 
 
4.3 Changes within Acquisition Episodes 
We also look at productivity and profitability changes from before to after acquisition 
events in a slightly different way, by comparing acquired plants to the incumbent plants of 
acquiring firms. This in effect uses the incumbent plants as a control group. We lose some data as 
a result of this because in 37 acquisitions the acquirer came from outside the industry and hence 
had no incumbent plants. Additionally, timelines of available data on some incumbent plants 
were too short to be usable. Therefore, the exercise here is limited to 49 acquisitions. The benefit 
is that this within-acquisition approach allows us to explicitly compare plants’ productivity and 
profitability levels and changes while controlling for specific circumstances surrounding each 
acquisition by including acquisition-year fixed effects.20
The specification is as follows: 
 
 𝑦�𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖 × 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , (2) 
where 𝑦�𝑖𝑡 is the outcome variable of plant i at time t if it is an acquired plant, while the outcome 
variables of incumbent plants are collapsed to 𝑦�𝑖𝑡 = 1#𝑚𝐴∑ 𝜔𝑗𝑦𝑗𝑡𝑗∈𝑚𝐴 , where 𝑚𝐴  denotes the 
particular acquisition case in which plant i was acquired and #𝑚𝐴 is the number of incumbent 
plants in acquisition 𝑚𝐴. Thus, 𝑦�𝑖𝑡 in the case of incumbent plants is the weighted average of 
outcomes of those plants within the given acquisition. The variable AAit is a dummy equal to 1 if 
acquisition mA happened prior to year t and zero otherwise, while the variable Acquiredi is equal 
                                                 
20  To avoid problems stemming from the fact that plants previously acquired by serial acquirers are already 
“incumbent” plants when another acquisition happens (which can be as early as in the same year), we only label a 
previously acquired plant as an incumbent after being under the new ownership for five years. The results presented 
below are not sensitive to other reasonable cutoffs or to leaving only serial acquirers’ originally owned plants in the 
“incumbent” category. 
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to 1 if plant i is purchased in acquisition case mA and zero otherwise; mit is the acquisition-year 
fixed effect, and µt is the calendar year fixed effect included when the outcome variable is ROCE 
to control for inflation (it is not included in the regression with TFPQ as the outcome variable 
because, by construction, TFPQ is the residual from the production function estimated inclusive 
of year dummies). In the main text, we assign weights ωj = 1 to all incumbent plants in a given 
acquisition mA, which allows us to interpret coefficients 𝛽1 , 𝛽2 , and 𝛽3  similarly to the 
interpretation given to them in standard difference-in-difference estimations. In particular, ?̂?3 
reflects the post-acquisition difference-in-difference between acquired and incumbent plants of 
acquiring firms, accounting for acquisition-case effects. We limit the sample time period to 4 
years before and 8 years after the acquisition event, but reasonable alternative timeline cutoffs 
produce similar results.21
The estimation results are presented in Table 3. The first two columns of numbers reflect 
TFPQ and plant ROCE results (respectively) for all acquisitions, while the latter two columns 
look only at acquisitions by the five serial acquirers. 
 
In both TFPQ specifications, the estimates of the interaction coefficient 𝛽3 are positive 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The post-acquisition improvement of TFPQ of 
acquired plants (this time relative to incumbent plants of the acquirer) averages about 10 percent 
for all acquisitions and more than 13 percent for acquisitions by serial acquirers. In addition, the 
acquired plant dummy coefficients are small and statistically insignificant in both samples, 
confirming the Table 2 result that there is no systematic difference between the physical TFP of 
acquired and incumbent plants prior to acquisitions (confirmed in year-by-year estimations 
presented in Appendix K). 
[Table 3 about here] 
In the profitability regressions, 𝛽3 is also positive and statistically significant. Profit rates 
of acquired plants rise by over five percentage points relative to acquiring firms’ plants in the 
whole sample and by more than seven percentage points in acquisitions by serial acquirers. Here, 
acquired plant dummy coefficients are negative, reflecting the profitability deficit of acquired 
                                                 
21 We also estimated equation (2) employing kernel weights obtained from the Mahalanobis distance measure where 
acquired and incumbent plants are matched on plant size, age and location, and also using a standard difference-in-
difference procedure ignoring acquisition-based matching altogether. The results of these estimations were very 
similar to those presented in Table 3 (see Tables A5 and A6 in Appendix F). 
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firms before acquisition.22
These results further reinforce what we document above: acquisition was accompanied 
by growth in the acquired plants’ productivity and profitability levels. We see here that this is 
true relative not only to the acquired plants’ own levels before the acquisition, but also relative to 
changes within incumbent plants owned by their acquiring firms. 
 
While matching by acquisition cases seems to be the most natural approach in our context, 
we did explore other matching possibilities as well. Specifically, we also matched acquired 
plants on pre-acquisition characteristics and also on pre-acquisition productivity trend with a 
control group of plants that were either never acquired or, at least, not acquired within the time 
window during which we compare them to acquired plants. The results of these estimations were 
very similar to the ones presented here. See Tables A8 and A9 in Appendix F. 
 
4.4 Profitability Differentials: Decomposition 
We have so far found that incumbent plants of acquiring firms have higher profitability 
(ROCE) than future acquired plants prior to acquisition, but not greater physical productivity 
(TFPQ). After being purchased, however, acquired plants improve in terms of not just ROCE but 
also TFPQ. Moreover, neither the pre-acquisition difference in profitability between acquiring 
and acquired firms nor the post-acquisition improvement in profitability of acquired plants seem 
to be driven by price differentials that could be attributed to market power. When considered 
together, these findings present a sort of puzzle: if it is neither prices nor productivity, what 
makes incumbent plants more profitable than acquired plants before acquisition? And how do 
acquisitions by more profitable firms lead to improved TFPQ in acquired plants? 
To begin exploring this puzzle, we decompose the pre-acquisition profitability differential 
between acquiring and acquired firms as well as the pre- to post-acquisition profitability changes 
for acquired plants into their various components. This lets us isolate the most important factors 
driving profitability differences. 
                                                 
22 We also estimated a regression similar to (2) with the outcome variable being the count-adjusted plant output 
price relative to the industry-year average. As in the previous subsection, we did not find any big differences before 
and after acquisitions in either acquired or incumbent plants, with a possible exception of plants bought by serial 
acquirers, where 𝛽3 was estimated to be 0.064 with a p-value of 0.10. The coefficient 𝛽2 on the post-acquisition time 
dummy is economically and statistically indistinguishable from zero, however, indicating that somewhat higher 
post-acquisition prices of acquired plants are not shared with incumbent plants. It thus appears that any increase in 
post-acquisition prices of acquired plants might be a reflection of unobserved quality improvement rather than 
market power, which would presumably be shared by both acquired and incumbent plants. 
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We first express a plant’s ROCE as the net value of cotton yarn produced and the plant’s 
labor and capital costs (all per unit of capital assets): 
( )1 ii i i i
i i i i
Y w L R
C C C C
υπ −
= − − .      (3) 
Here,  is plant i’s operating income. Yi denotes the value of its output, and  is the fraction of 
intermediate input and non-labor operational costs in the value of output (e.g., the costs of raw 
cotton, energy, etc.). Plant wage costs are wiLi, Ri is capital cost, and Ci is plant i’s share of its 
owning firm’s assets (the sum of shareholders’ capital and interest-bearing debt). The details of 
variable construction are described in Appendix E. In a nutshell, we use plant price and output 
data to obtain Y and plant-level data on the number of worker-days and daily wages to obtain wL. 
Capital cost is calculated as the sum of depreciation of fixed capital and interest payments on 
borrowed capital, with both depreciation and interest rates assumed to be the same for all plants, 
as is the parameter  (these values are estimated from the available firm-level and industry-wide 
data). All nominal values are divided by the consumer price index to account for inflation. 
We present the results of decomposition (3) in Table 4. There are three panels, each 
corresponding to the decomposition of a particular profitability differential. The top panel 
compares plants of acquired firms (“acquired plants”) and those of their future acquirers 
(“incumbent plants”) for up to 4 years prior to acquisition events. The bottom two panels 
compare acquired plants before and after acquisitions, with the post-acquisition years split as in 
the regressions above: the middle panel looks at the first 3 years immediately following the 
acquisition, and the bottom panel looks at the subsequent post-acquisition years. 
The top panel of Table 4 shows that incumbent plants’ 3.3 percentage point (66 percent) 
ROCE advantage over acquired plants is mostly explained by the net output value to total assets 
ratio (the first term on the right hand side of (3)).23
                                                 
23 The ROCE differential in the top panel of Table 6 is similar in magnitude to the coefficient on acquired plant 
dummy obtained from the specification in Table 5, where it was 0.031. The same holds when we compare all other 
differentials below with the corresponding regression coefficients. This similarity between decompositions results 
using raw data and regression analyses is reassuring. Some discrepancy is to be expected, of course, as the 
regression analyses are conducted absorbing year and acquisition effects as well as plant fixed effects. 
 This ratio is on average 4.1 percentage points 
higher in acquiring plants. Wage costs per unit of assets are actually higher in incumbent than in 
acquired plants, reducing the ROCE difference. Capital costs are similar, though statistically 
smaller for incumbents. The relative similarity of capital costs reflects similarity in the ratios of 
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fixed capital to total assets and interest-bearing debt to shareholders capital (not shown). 
The bottom two panels of Table 4 show the decomposition of acquired plants’ ROCE 
changes around acquisition episodes. ROCE improves by 3.9 percentage points (64 percent) in 
the first three post-acquisition years and by 4.6 percentage points (75 percent) in the longer run. 
As with the cross-sectional differences, the bulk of the profitability changes came from growth in 
acquired plants’ ratios of net output value to total assets. 
[Table 4 about here] 
The centrality of net output value—essentially, gross margin—in explaining profitability 
differences leads naturally to a second decomposition. We break the net output to capital ratio 
into a product of a) price, net of intermediate input and non-labor operation cost per unit output; 
b) total input of capital and labor services per total assets; and c) TFPQ. Taking logs, we obtain  
( )
( )ˆexp






 = + + 
    
,   (4)  
where  ≡ (1– ) denotes the unit price margin (common to all plants and firms), pi is plant i’s 
output price, 𝑌�𝑖 is the total combined input of logged capital and labor in the production function 
(and thus equals logged physical output predicted from the production function regression), and 
TFPQi is the residual from the production function. We use this expression to measure the 
relative contribution of these three components to the net value of output per unit of shareholders’ 
capital. These decompositions are presented in Table 5. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Consistent with the regression analyses in the previous section, price and TFPQ 
differentials contribute relatively little to the stark profitability differences between acquired and 
incumbent plants before the acquisition (top panel). Most of the difference is instead driven by 
the ratio of predicted output (or combined total inputs) to total assets, . 
This gives us a hint to resolving the puzzle that motivated our decomposition exercise: 
while prices and physical productivity of plants conditional on operating are similar, the numbers 
in the top panel imply that for the same amount of capital invested by shareholders, incumbent 
plants somehow manage to mobilize over 25 percent more of their combined inputs toward 
production than do acquired plants in pre-acquisition years. (Recall that our TFPQ metric is 
estimated with respect to capital and labor inputs measured as flows of services; that is, we are 
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measuring the plant’s productivity conditional on it operating.) 
Acquired plants’ changes in gross margin per unit assets in the bottom panels of Table 5 
indicate a larger role for TFPQ in profitability growth, at least in the long run. As in Table 3, 
TFPQ initially improves modestly, again with growth in input use per unit assets explaining most 
of acquired plants’ gains in profitability. In the long run, though, TFPQ growth accounts for 11 
points of a 28 log point improvement in net output value per unit assets, while the impact of the 
input per asset ratio became small. As shown in Appendix G, this is due to a big increase in the 
retained earnings component of acquired plants’ shareholders capital and can thus be interpreted 
as a consequence of years of accumulated high profits. In contrast to the regression analysis, the 
contribution of the price margin in the decomposition approach is relatively large and 
statistically significant. 
 What is it that allows acquiring firms to systematically mobilize and put to direct use in 
production process a greater share of their total assets than acquired firms? Table A.12 in 
Appendix G further decomposes combined input to total assets ratio  into the ratio of 
combined inputs to available capacity (reflecting capacity utilization rates) and the ratio of 
capacity to total assets. It turns out that incumbent plants’ advantage in input mobilization is 
almost entirely explained by their higher capacity utilization rates—the rates of capital services 
extracted from the installed machine capacity and the corresponding rates of labor services 
applied to this capacity. This ratio jumps 9 percent in acquired plants in the first few years after 
acquisition and by more than 16 percent in the long run. Thus acquisitions immediately lead to 
higher rates of employment of available capital resources (and correspondingly higher 
employment of labor, as can be seen from the increases in total labor cost per total assets for 
acquired plants in Table 4). Ratios of capacity to total assets, on the other hand, are statistically 
indistinguishable in pre-acquisition years between incumbent and future acquired plants. 
Putting the results of these decompositions together, we find that pre-acquisition 
profitability (ROCE) differences prior to acquisition arise mostly because acquiring firms’ plants 
utilize their available capital and labor more intensively than do acquired firms’ plants. This also 
contributed the bulk of short-term profitability improvement in acquired plants post-acquisition. 
In the longer run, on the other hand, TFPQ improvements become more prominent in raising the 
profitability of acquired plants. 
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4.5 The Link from Profitability to Productivity: The Role of Demand Management 
Why were stronger firms able to utilize their productive capacity so much more than 
weaker firms? In this section we seek an answer by looking at the ability of stronger companies 
to manage the industry’s inherent demand variations better. 
As we discussed in Section 2, a lack of price differentiation does not mean that output-
market conditions were equivalent across firms. To quantitatively explore possible differences in 
firms’ demand-facing operations, we investigate patterns in plants’ finished goods inventory and 
accrued revenues on delivered output (that is, the payment for which is in arrears). We choose 
these metrics because both may indicate that the plant is having difficulty finding buyers in a 
timely manner or finding buyers who can be relied upon to disburse payments on time. This in 
turn may explain capital utilization differences, which under this interpretation reflect poor 
management of matching production to demand or difficulty in finding (reliable) buyers. Indeed, 
anecdotal evidence from company histories suggests that inventories and payment arrears were 
intrinsically linked to utilization in the industry, as firms would often halt production as unsold 
yarn and accrued revenues piled up, and would resume only after the gridlock had cleared.24
In Table 6 we present producers’ ratios of period-end finished goods inventories, accrued 
revenues and the sum of these (“unrealized output” for short) to the value of their output over the 
period, split by different categories of plants in the same way as in the previous sections.
 
25
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Incumbent plants’ ratios of unrealized output to their output value were about 60 percent lower 
than the same ratios of acquired plants. Post-acquisition, acquired plants’ inventory to output 
values ratios fell by 60 percent in the first three years, and by further 10 percent after that. 
Within-acquisition comparisons of acquired and incumbent plants (not shown) yield very similar 
patterns. 
There are many possible sources of cotton spinning firms’ abilities to manage demand. 
While many of these are difficult to quantify, one important factor already mentioned in Section 
                                                 
24  We also looked at stocks of intermediate goods and unfinished products but found no evidence that those 
systematically influenced outcomes. 
25 Finished goods inventories and accrued revenues are positively correlated in the data, but the correlation is not 
that high (about 0.22 for both incumbent and acquired plants). There may be a certain substitutability between the 
two, as having difficulty finding reputable buyers in a timely fashion might lead a firm to reach out to lesser buyers 
who are more likely to fall into arrears. Therefore, the total “unrealized output” seems to be the best metric to 
measure demand-facing operations efficiency. Nevertheless, the evidence presented in Table 6 indicates that all the 
three metrics paint a similar and consistent picture. 
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2 was that in low-demand times, major trading houses rationed their demand to certain producers. 
This suggests a mechanism similar to positive assortative matching, where long-term 
relationships established between reputable industry producers and prominent traders allowed 
those producers to sustain more consistent operations, resulting in the lower inventories and 
higher utilization levels observed above. 
To explore this possibility quantitatively, we used the 1898 edition of Nihon Zenkoku 
Shoukou Jinmeiroku, a nationwide registry of names of traders and manufacturers, to extract the 
names of individuals likely to play the most prominent role in cotton spinners’ output markets. 
This yielded a list of 154 individuals.26
We then tested whether a producer’s relationship to trading houses in this way is reflected 
in the performance metrics we explored above. Table 7 presents the means of ROCE and ratios 
of unrealized output to the value of output (both taken directly from firms’ accounts), as well as 
spindle utilization rates and output prices from plant-level data for in-network and out-of-
network firms. (Figures A3-A6 in Appendix H plot the corresponding distributions.) Since our 
in- or out-of-network classification is based primarily on the 1898 shareholders and board 
composition data, we limit our attention to years 1898-1902 to obtain a reasonable number of 
observations while not going too far forward, as board and shareholders (as well as traders’ 
importance) of course changed over time. 
 We then matched these individuals to the lists of board 
members and top 10-12 shareholders of the 67 firms for which we have company reports in 1898 
(this is 90 percent of firms operating that year). Of a total of 1,197 board members and top 
shareholders, 128 were in the list of the 154 most prominent traders described above. Of the 67 
firms, 33 had at least one prominent trader among its board members and top shareholders. We 
create a “trader network” indicator equal to 1 if the firm is one of these 33 or one of two more 
firms for which firm histories (Kinugawa, 1964) clearly indicated connectedness to major traders 
at their inception (we refer to these as “in-network” firms) and 0 otherwise (these are “out-of-
network” firms). 
[Table 7 about here] 
The results in Table 7 show that ROCE of “in-network” firms was much higher than that 
                                                 
26 These individuals fit into groups meeting one of three criteria. One group included 98 cotton yarn and yarn-related 
traders across Japan who paid more than 50,000 yen in operating tax that year. A second group included 25 
individuals listed as board members of the 4 largest incorporated cotton yarn-related trade companies (Naigaimen, 
Nihon Menka, Nitto Menshi and Mitsui Bussan). Finally, the third group includes the 31 board members and traders 
registered at the Osaka cotton and cotton yarn exchange. 
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of “out-of-network” firms (recall that 1898-1902 was when demand constraints first presented 
themselves very strongly in the young industry’s history). The trader network indicator is also 
associated with a large drop (on the order of 40 percent) in the average of plants’ ratios of 
unrealized to produced output. The distributions of both ROCE and unrealized output ratios of 
in-network firms are basically rightward shifts of the corresponding distributions of out-of-
network firms (see Figures A3 and A4 in Appendix H). In-network firms also have higher 
capacity utilization and prices, although these differences are smaller than in unrealized output 
ratios and are not equally pronounced across the whole distributions (Figures A5 and A6 in 
Appendix H). In particular, the distributions of prices of in- and out-of-network plants are quite 
similar up to the utmost right tail, where there are no more plants of out-of-network firms but 
still some plants of in-network firms selling at very high prices. 
Overall, these results suggest that close relationships between industry producers and 
prominent traders may have allowed “matched” producers to manage demand fluctuations more 
effectively, particularly with regard to being able to operate with lower average inventory levels 
and often at greater capacity utilization levels as well. Notably, in-network firms were also more 
likely to acquire other firms in the future (the sample probability of being a future acquiring firm 
is 0.79 for an in-network firm as opposed to 0.21 for an out-of-network firm). Hence, 
relationships with traders’ networks (along with perhaps other demand management 
mechanisms) can explain why an initial profitability gap existed, and why it was closed by 
acquisition. But of course we observed TFPQ gains upon acquisition too (though there was no 
prior gap). This is consistent with the profitability story above if demand management is 
correlated with broader managerial ability that raised operational efficiency as well. We explore 
this connection in Section 5 below. 
 
4.6. Robustness 
As already mentioned, we have conducted several robustness checks.  We relegate the 
details to Appendix F for the sake of parsimony, but we briefly describe the exercises here. 
Our benchmark results above use TFPQ estimates obtained as residuals from a 
production function estimated via OLS. However, the classic “transmission bias” problem of a 
correlation between unobserved productivity shocks and producers’ input choices may cause 
OLS estimates to be biased. Therefore we also ran our specifications using TFPQ values 
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constructed via four alternative methods designed to avoid transmission bias. One estimator 
included plant fixed effects in the production function, eliminating any bias caused by permanent 
productivity differences across plants. A second used the Wooldridge (2009) “proxy variable” 
estimator (which is a generalization of Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). A third was the Blundell-
Bond (1988) “system GMM” estimator, which treats inputs as endogenous variables, allows for 
autoregressive errors and employs lagged values as GMM-type instruments, together with other 
instruments that are thought to be orthogonal to fixed effects. The fourth is a Solow-style index 
number, where TFPQ is constructed as logged physical output minus a weighted sum of inputs. 
The theoretically correct weights are the elasticities of output with respect to each input; 
empirically, these are measured as the inputs’ share of total industry costs. In all cases, the results 
(presented in Appendix F) were qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those above. 
We also constructed multiple alternative control groups to the incumbent-owned plants 
we used above. These alternative approaches used matching techniques to construct a set of 
control plants that looked like plants that were to be acquired in other respects. In the first 
matched sample, comparison plants of acquired plant i are incumbent plants that had been 
managed by the same owner who acquired plant i. The second matched sample formed matches 
based on whether a non-acquired plant is similar to acquired plant i in terms of pre-acquisition 
characteristics or trends in outcome variables. The construction of and results from these 
matched samples are detailed in Appendix F, Section F.3. To summarize, the basic patterns above 
were qualitatively and quantitatively robust to these alternative control groups. 
Finally, we performed a simple placebo test by randomly assigning acquisition status to 
plants and then estimating the relationships between our outcome variables and this randomly 
generated acquisition status. The procedure and results are detailed in Appendix F, Section F.4.) 
We repeated this process 1,000 times and calculated the sample mean of the estimated 
coefficients relating “acquisition” to outcomes. In most cases, the magnitudes were only 
fractions of their analogs from the true acquisition samples. 
 
5. A Mechanism 
Our empirical results point to some sort of demand management ability (reflected 
empirically in capital utilization levels, related to unrealized output rates) as driving variation in 
productivity and profitability across plants, both in the cross section and over time (the latter 
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with regard to acquisition events). In this section, we offer a simple theory that elucidates one 
channel through which fundamental heterogeneity across owner/managers leads to variations in 
the ability to manage demand, and through this, TFPQ and profitability. Further, if this 
heterogeneity is “carried” with the owner/manager in an acquisition into the target plants’ 
operations, it also explains the productivity and profitability changes that surround acquisition 
events that we estimated above. 
 The specific mechanism in the model involves a managerial time allocation decision, 
where owners/managers must trade off spending more time managing demand but at the cost of 
spending less time managing production. Further, managers and plants are both of heterogeneous 
quality. We show below how this framework delivers the empirical patterns we document above. 
That said, it is possible that other possible mechanisms could explain the data, and in any case 
we cannot test the time allocation model directly because we have no data on owners’/managers’ 
time allocations. Nevertheless, we find it useful to explicitly lay out a set of conditions and 
economic decisions that can yield the empirical patterns above. 
 
5.1 Plant Production and Demand  
For simplicity, we focus on a single plant, though implications from the model remain 
qualitatively the same if a firm operates several plants. The plant’s owner has access to the 
following production technology: 
𝑦 = 𝑔(𝑚)𝑥𝜔        (5) 
where 𝜔  is the given quality of a plant, and 𝑥  is the composite input of labor and capital, 
weighted appropriately. (For example, if the technology is Cobb-Douglas and there are constant 
returns to scale, the composite would be the plant’s inputs raised to their respective input 
elasticities). The function 𝑔(𝑚) is a flow of in-firm services provided by the plant manager to 
increase outputs from a given level of 𝑥𝜔. The variable m is the manager’s time allocated to 
managing production. This is divided into time spent ensuring that the plant operates at full 
capacity (therefore affecting input utilization), and time spent improving efficiency of operations 
themselves. For example, the former use of managerial time may involve making sure that 
machines are in working condition and that there are always enough workers to operate them.27
                                                 
27 Saxonhouse (1971) describes the problem of absenteeism in the industry. 
 
The time spent improving efficiency of operation, on the other hand, would involve monitoring 
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the production process, receiving reports from workers and team leaders and improving quality 
control and organizational structure of the firm.28 To ease notation, assume that 𝑔(𝑚) = √𝑢𝑣, 
where u denotes the time spent improving the frequency of operation (so that utilized input is 
given by 𝑥� = √𝑢𝑥 ), while v is the time spent improving plant performance conditional on 
operating, and thus augments the intrinsic plant productivity, which is thus equal to 𝜔� = √𝑣𝜔.29
We assume that the firm first chooses x to minimize the cost of producing a given y and 
then optimally chooses u, v, and y. Thus the input choice x is 
 
The total time spent managing the plant 𝑚 = 𝑢 + 𝑣 is assumed to be bounded between 0 and 
some 𝛾 > 0, the manager’s effective time endowment, which we discuss more below. 
𝑥∗ = 𝑦
√𝑢𝑣𝜔
,        (6) 
and the plant’s cost function is 𝑐(𝑦) = 𝑝𝑥𝑥∗ = 𝑦 √𝑢𝑣𝜔⁄ , where to simplify notation we have 
normalized the price of 𝑥 to 1 by an appropriate choice of units.  
We assume the plant takes price (determined by the exchanges) as given, but the quantity 
of demand it faces depends on managerial time allocation. Specifically, it produces and sells the 
amount of output given by 𝛾 −𝑚, so that revenues are 
𝑟 = 𝑝(𝛾 −𝑚),        (7) 
where 𝑝 is the output price. The function (𝛾 −𝑚) is the channel through which we introduce the 
notion of demand management; the plant’s demand depends on the time the manager allocates to 
selling product. Remember that 𝑚 is the total time the manager devotes toward production; this 
means that other things equal, a higher value of 𝑚 means less demand for output. From (6) and 
(7), profits are 




      (8) 
5.2 Optimal Allocation of Manager’s Time 
                                                 
28 Some anecdotal evidence about the importance of this sort of managerial activity can be found in, e.g., Kuwahara 
(2004). See also an example in Appendix B. 
29 Diminishing returns are not necessary for the results below to hold. In particular, all of the analyses in this section 
go through if we instead assume input utilization and augmented plant quality are simply proportional to managerial 
time spent on these activities, so that 𝑥� = 𝑢𝑥 and 𝜔� = 𝜔𝑥, although derivations become more cumbersome. 
30 We assume that p is greater than the plant’s marginal cost for at least some 𝑚0 < 𝛾, so that operation is profitable 
for all values of m between 𝑚0 and 𝛾. The (𝛾 − 𝑚) function limits the size of the plant, though it would be easy to 
introduce upward sloping marginal costs or downward sloping residual demand (say as in a monopolistically 
competitive structure) if one wanted to further constrain plant size. 
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The plant’s owner allocates his time between managing plant production and managing 
demand (sales) so as to maximize profit in (8):  max𝑢,𝑣(𝛾 − 𝑢 − 𝑣) �𝑝 − 1√𝑢𝑣𝜔� ,     (9) 
where we have made use of the relationship m = u + v. The optimal resource allocation problem 
(9) thus captures the fundamental tradeoff faced by the manager: if he devotes more time to 
managing sales, frequency and/or efficiency of operation are lost, and vice versa. This tradeoff is 
mitigated by effective time endowment 𝛾; a higher value of 𝛾 reduces the lost revenue from any 
m. The parameter 𝛾 is thus interpreted as “demand management ability,” such as a networking 
relationship with trading houses, reputation for reliability, as well as perhaps the ability to 
effectively collect debt. 
It is easy to see (see Appendix I for the proof) that at the optimum: 
u = v = m/2.         (10) 
We can thus restate (9) in terms of the optimal choice of the total time allocated to production 
management, m, as: 
 max𝑚(𝛾 −𝑚) �𝑝 − 2𝜔𝑚�.      (11) 
The first order condition is sufficient and it yields (after some manipulations): 
 𝑚(𝛾,𝜔) = �2𝛾 𝑝𝜔⁄ .       (12) 
and 
 𝜋(𝛾,𝜔) = ��𝛾𝑝𝜔 − √2�2 𝜔�      (13) 
(Note that by assumption, p > MC at the optimum, so the numerator on the right-hand side of 
(13) is strictly positive.) A simple comparative exercise yields the following results. 
 
Lemma 1:  
(i) 𝜕𝑚(𝛾,𝜔) 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0;  Time allocated to managing production at the plant, 𝑚(𝛾,𝜔), increases 
with 𝛾. Moreover, both input utilization 𝑥� and augmented productivity 𝜔� also increase with 𝛾. 
(ii) 𝜕𝜋(𝛾,𝜔) 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0  and 𝜕𝜋(𝛾,𝜔) 𝜕𝜔⁄ > 0 ; also, 𝜕𝑥∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0 . That is, profits increase in 
ability 𝛾 and plant quality 𝜔, while total inputs also increase in ability 𝛾. 
 (iii) 𝜕2𝜋(𝛾,𝜔) 𝜕𝛾𝜕𝜔⁄ > 0; ability 𝛾 and plant quality 𝜔 are complements in the profit function.  
Proof: See Appendix I. 
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Lemma 1 implies increasing returns to demand management ability, which manifest 
themselves in both an increased span of control in production, 𝑥∗, and input utilization, which is 
an increasing function of m. Augmented plant efficiency also increases in demand management 
ability, implying that output increases with ability even controlling for total input and its 
utilization. The first feature is consistent with our decomposition results in the previous section 
that showed an advantage of more profitable firms (with higher demand management ability) in 
the combined input employed and capacity utilization rates as compared to less profitable firms 
(with lower demand management ability). The second feature is consistent with TFPQ measured 
conditional on capacity utilization increasing once a plant owned by a less profitable firm is 
acquired by a more profitable firm. 
 
5.3 Mergers and Acquisitions 
We employ a setting inspired by the Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) structure, which 
was developed with the evolution of the U.S. tire industry in mind but also fits some stark 
patterns in our data. Specifically, assume that an initial “basic” state of technological knowledge 
arrives first, offering the possibility of entry by the industry’s first cohort of entrants. The “basic” 
nature of this initial technological knowledge is manifested in the low quality of plants, 𝜔1, 
available for the first entry cohort. Later, at some time T, there is an unanticipated jump in the 
state of technology (aka “refinement” in the Jovanovic-MacDonald model). This is reflected in 
higher quality, 𝜔2 > 𝜔1, of plants available for new entrants after time T. 
Each entrant comes into the industry with some initial level of demand management 
ability, 𝛾0 . Producers from the early cohort have an opportunity to develop this ability (for 
instance, by building reputation for consistent delivery) above and beyond the initial level, 
however. Assume that when the second cohort enters the market at T, the first cohort’s ability is 
already distributed with support [𝛾0, 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑥]. 
Even though all entrants in the second cohort possess only the initial level of sales 
management ability, the quality of their plants is higher because they incorporate the superior 
technology. This leads to a new market equilibrium where only plant owners in the first cohort 
whose ability exceeds a threshold level 𝛾𝑒 ∈ (𝛾0, 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑥) can remain in the industry; those with 
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ability below this threshold have to exit.31
After time T, an opportunity to negotiate a merger or acquisition arrives at a random rate, 
and plant owners are randomly matched into negotiating pairs. It is clear that under the 
circumstances described above, whenever an acquisition actually occurs, it involves a higher-
ability manager acquiring a plant managed by a lower-ability manager. Let a negotiating pair be 
formed between a manager with ability 𝛾𝐻 and a manager with ability 𝛾𝐿, where 𝛾𝐻 > 𝛾𝐿 ≥ 1. 
By Lemma 1, we have 𝜋(𝜔, 𝛾𝐻) > 𝜋(𝜔, 𝛾𝐿). Therefore a manager with ability 𝛾𝐻 has a potential 
incentive to acquire the plant of a manager with ability 𝛾𝐿 regardless of the plant’s quality. The 
following Proposition, proven and discussed further in Appendix I, summarizes empirical 
predictions for acquisition patterns:  
 Thus, after time T, the industry is comprised of a 
mixture of incumbents with (differentiated) high ability levels operating low-quality plants and 
new entrants with only basic ability but operating high-quality plants. 
 
Proposition 1: In any acquisition, a higher-ability plant owner acquires a plant managed by a 
lower-ability plant owner. Higher-quality plants are more likely to change ownership than lower-
quality plants. Together, these imply that the most common acquisition pattern will involve a 
high-ability early entrant with a relatively aged plant acquiring a more recent entrant with lower 
ability but a newer plant. 
Proof: See Appendix I. 
 
5.4 Implications for Productivity and Profitability 
We now derive implications of the merger and acquisition process outlined above for 
productivity and profitability of acquired plants. These implications are consistent with the 
patterns documented in our empirical analyses in Section 4. 
To discuss the implications for productivity, note that a plant’s TFPQ is given by  
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑄 ≡ 𝑦 𝑢(𝛾)𝑥⁄ = 𝑣(𝛾)𝜔.       (14) 
Lemma 1(i) implies that, for a given 𝜔, TFPQ will increase with the acquiring firm 
manager’s ability 𝛾. Similarly, Lemma 1(ii) says that profits increase with manager’s ability. 
Proposition 1 says that a higher-ability manager acquires a plant managed by a lower-ability 
manager. Together, these imply 
                                                 
31 See Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994). In our data, 10 out of 21 firms that had operated in the industry prior to the 
late 1880s had remained small and exited by shutting their plants. 
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Proposition 2: Both the productivity and the profitability of an acquired plant rise after an 
acquisition. 
 
Lemma 1(iii) implies increasing returns to ability in the plant profit function. Therefore: 
 
Proposition 3: After an acquisition, the acquired plant’s profits increase by more than its TFPQ. 
Proof: See Appendix I. 
 
The key intuition behind both Propositions 2 and 3 is that the new manager’s superior ability to 
manage demand (sales) allows him to increase the time allocated to managing the production 
facility without sacrificing actual sales at any given price.  
We next derive implications that allow us to compare the pre-acquisition levels of 
productivity and profitability of acquired plants with those of acquiring plants. The total 









� 𝑑𝜔 + �𝑝 − �2𝑝𝛾
𝜔
�𝑑𝛾.    (15) 
The first term in (15) captures the effect on profit of plant quality differential between acquired 
and acquiring plants, whereas the second term is the effect of managers’ ability differential. 
If two incumbents are involved in a merger negotiation, the plant quality is the same, i.e., 
𝑑𝜔 = 0. In this case, (15) immediately implies that the profit of the acquiring plant is higher in 
the pre-acquisition period than that of the acquired plant because the acquiring plant has a 
higher-ability owner; i.e., 𝑑𝛾 > 0. When the acquired plant is owned by a new entrant, on the 
other hand, the acquiring plant’s quality is lower than the acquired plant’s quality; i.e., 𝑑𝜔 < 0. 
Therefore relative pre-acquisition profits depend on whether the plant quality effect dominates 
the manager’s ability effect or vice versa. In Appendix I we formally establish the following:   
 
Proposition 4: Under suitable parameter values, pre-acquisition TFPQ of an acquiring plant can 
be lower than that of an acquired plant even though pre-acquisition profitability of an acquiring 
plant is higher than that of an acquired plant. Other things equal, this is more likely to happen if 
the ability of the acquiring manager, 𝛾𝐻, is high. 
Proof: See Appendix I. 
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Proposition 4 is consistent with the empirical patterns we saw in our data, but it is in 
contrast to both the assortative matching and the “Q” theories of mergers. A simple numerical 
example of the model in Appendix J illustrates how the mechanism outlined above can deliver all 
the patterns observed in our empirical analyses. 
 We have shown how a managerial time allocation decision, in the presence of 
heterogeneous quality managers and plants, can yield the empirical patterns documented above. 
We note again, however, that other possible mechanisms may be able to tie demand management 
to productivity and profitability levels and changes through acquisition. Further, we do not have 
data on owner/managers’ time allocations, so we cannot test the model directly. Nonetheless, the 
theoretical framework outlined in this section offers a concrete example against which both the 
data and other theories can be compared. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
We have used unusually detailed data to investigate how acquisitions and the associated 
management turnover affect the performance of the firms directly involved in the transaction as 
well as the broader industry. These effects have been the subject of substantial, if inconclusive, 
theoretical and empirical research in the prior literature. Because our data allow us to observe 
outcomes and mechanisms at a typically unavailable level of detail, we were able to make 
progress toward gaining further insights. 
We find in our setting (the Japanese cotton spinning industry during the turn of the 20th 
century) a more nuanced picture than the straightforward “higher productivity buys lower 
productivity” story commonly appealed to in the literature. Because they owned systematically 
newer and better vintages of capital equipment, acquired firms’ production facilities were not on 
average any less physically productive than the plants of the acquiring firms before acquisition, 
at least conditional on operating. However, they were much less profitable. This profitability 
difference appears to reflect acquired firms’ problems in managing the inherent demand 
uncertainties in the industry. These demand management problems resulted in consistently higher 
inventory levels and lower capacity utilization among acquired producers, raising per-unit capital 
costs. We show that once purchased by more profitable firms, the acquired plants saw drops in 
inventories and gains in capacity utilization that raised both their productivity and profitability 
levels, patterns consistent with acquiring owner/managers spreading their better demand 
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management abilities across the acquired capital. This link between demand management, 
productivity, and profitability is, to our knowledge, a new mechanism in the literature examining 
how management can affect business performance. 
While our data are historical in nature, we believe the patterns we document in this 
particular industry and time have broader lessons. They demonstrate that the ties between 
productivity, profitability, and ownership can be subtle while still providing a clear mechanism to 
spur an industry’s growth. Further, they introduce a new mechanism through which superior 
managers lead to performance gains. Finally, Japan during the sample was essentially a 
developing country, less than two decades removed from a difficult transition to modernity. Thus 
the processes we explore here may offer specific insights into ways in which firms and industries 
in developing countries might achieve self-sustaining growth. 
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Figure 1. Domestic output, import and export of cotton yarn (1887-1914) 
 
Source: Nihon Choki Tokei Soran, our estimates. 
 
 
Figure 2. Capacity dynamics of older, acquired, and newer plants 
 
Source: Our estimates using the data described in Section 4 below.32
  
 
                                                 
32 “Older never acquired” are plants that came into operation in 1902 or earlier and were never targets in an 
acquisition. “Newer never acquired” are plants that started operating in 1908 or later and had not been acquired by 
1920. “Acquired plants” is the total capacity of those plants (regardless of whether they had been acquired or not 
yet), while the dashed line is the capacity of those that had already gone through at least one acquisition. 
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plants Acquired plants 
Exiting 
plants 
   
First cohort Second cohort  
TFPQ Mean -0.004 0.003 0.125 -0.162 
(SD) (0.182) (0.229) (0.226) (0.513) 
Earnings per paid-in 
value of shares 
Mean 0.274 0.183 0.148 0.159 
(SD) (0.205) (0.076) (0.136) (0.101) 
Price (yen/400lb) Mean 94.7 92.8 93.2 91.7 
(SD) (6.5) (4.2) (9.8) (7.0) 
Days in operation Mean 311 315 253 265 
(SD) (65) (29) (104) (66) 
Equipment age Mean 5.28 5.87 2.50 11.77 
(SD) (3.49) (2.77) (1.18) (6.69) 
Firm age Mean 9.13 11.30 2.66 12.54 
(SD) (5.08) (3.56) (1.49) (7.86) 
Observations 32 33 38 24 
Note: TFPQ (quantity-based total factor productivity) is estimated as residuals from the Cobb-Douglas production 
function using all available observations for years 1896-97 as described in the main text. ROCE is return on equity, 
accounting profits divided by shareholders’ paid-in capital. There are only 6 ROCE observations available for 
exiting plants in these years. Days in operation per year, equipment and firm age are measured in years. First cohort 
is plants of firms that started operating before 1892, second cohort is plants of firms that started operating in 1892 
and after. Acquiring plants refer to plants belonging to future acquiring firms, exiting plants refer to plants belonging 




Table 2. Within-acquired-plants comparisons of productivity, profitability and prices 
 
 All acquisitions By serial acquirer 










-0.012 0.006 -0.003 -0.014 0.020 0.030 
(0.030) (0.015) (0.032) (0.056) (0.020) (0.037) 
Early post-acquisition 
dummy 
0.039 0.045* 0.020 0.112* 0.115*** 0.092 
(0.039) (0.026) (0.042) (0.065) (0.024) (0.069) 
Late post-acquisition 
dummy 
0.129** 0.071** 0.024 0.217** 0.146*** 0.129 
(0.058) (0.030) (0.052) (0.081) (0.034) (0.080) 
Log spindles-days in 
operation 
0.736***   0.717***   
(0.042)   (0.083)   
Log worker-days 0.258***   0.250***   
(0.038)   (0.058)   
Log capacity change -0.095* -0.075*** 0.043 -0.149 -0.129** -0.033 
(0.052) (0.026) (0.034) (0.117) (0.051) (0.052) 
Constant -1.320** 0.155*** 4.722*** -0.977 0.022 4.771*** 
(0.570) (0.012) (0.028) (1.144) (0.052) (0.037) 
Plant fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquisition fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,248 949 1,213 555 468 530 
Adjusted R-squared 0.942 0.616 0.835 0.922 0.648 0.860 
Note: The omitted category includes period three years or more prior to acquisition. Serial acquirers are Kanegafuchi Boseki, Mie Boseki, Osaka Boseki, 
Settsu Boseki, and Amagasaki Boseki. The omitted category includes period three years or more prior to acquisition. Robust standard errors clustered at 





Table 3. Within-acquisition comparisons of productivity and profitability:  
acquired and incumbent plants 
 
 All acquisitions By serial acquirers 
 TFPQ Plant ROCE TFPQ Plant ROCE 
After acquisition -0.034 0.001 -0.014 0.003 
(0.027) (0.016) (0.026) (0.019) 
Acquired plant 0.025 -0.030* 0.017 -0.035* 
(0.035) (0.015) (0.026) (0.018) 
After acquisition x 
Acquired plant 
0.096** 0.050** 0.132*** 0.071*** 
(0.036) (0.020) (0.038) (0.023) 
Constant 0.036 0.111*** 0.099*** 0.076*** 
(0.020) (0.027) (0.025) (0.018) 
Year dummies No Yes No Yes 
Acquisition–year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,398 1,261 1,001 905 
R-squared 0.185 0.445 0.351 0.460 
Note: Serial acquirers are Kanegafuchi Boseki, Mie Boseki, Osaka Boseki, Settsu Boseki, and Amagasaki 
Boseki. TFPQ is estimated residual from the production function using all available data. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the acquisition case level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4. Decomposition of plants’ returns on capital: incumbent and acquired plants, and 











ROCE 0.050 0.083 0.033 65.6*** 
of which      
net output value/total assets 0.152 0.193 0.041 26.7*** 
minus:      
wage cost/total assets 0.056 0.068 0.012 21.7*** 
capital cost/total assets 0.046 0.042 -0.004 -9.6*** 
# of observations 120 213   
     










ROCE 0.062 0.101 0.039 63.7*** 
of which      
net output value/total assets 0.165 0.206 0.042 25.4*** 
minus:      
wage cost/total assets 0.057 0.067 0.010 17.8*** 
capital cost/total assets 0.046 0.038 -0.008 -17.3*** 
# of observations 137 130   
     










ROCE 0.062 0.108 0.046 74.8*** 
of which      
net output value/total assets 0.165 0.198 0.033 20.2*** 
minus:      
wage cost/total assets 0.057 0.059 0.002 3.6 
capital cost/total assets 0.046 0.030 -0.015 -33.2*** 
# of observations 137 231   
Note: The pre-acquisition time period includes observations on up to 4 years prior to acquisition. “Early 
after acquisition” period includes 3 years immediately following acquisitions. “Late after acquisition” 
period includes years starting from year 4 after acquisitions. Nominal variables are deflated by the annual 
consumer price index. Details of variable construction are explained in Appendix E. ***, **, and * indicate 
that the corresponding difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 
percent level, respectively, using a double-sided t-test. 
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Table 5. Decomposition of plants’ net output values: incumbent and acquired plants and 











ln(net output value/total assets) -2.024 -1.704 0.319 37.6*** 
of which:     
ln(price margin) -1.354 -1.307 0.047 4.8* 
ln(total input/total assets) -0.654 -0.406 0.248 28.1*** 
TFPQ -0.016 0.009 0.024 2.5 
# of observations 117 206   
     
Pre- and early post- acquisition 









ln(net output value/total assets) -1.971 -1.701 0.270 31.0*** 
of which:     
ln(price margin) -1.359 -1.290 0.069 7.2** 
ln(total input/total assets) -0.599 -0.456 0.143 15.4** 
TFPQ -0.012 0.045 0.057 5.9** 
# of observations 139 131   
     
Pre- and late post- acquisition 









ln(net output value/total assets) -1.971 -1.722 0.248 28.2*** 
of which:     
ln(price margin) -1.359 -1.252 0.107 11.3*** 
ln(total input/total assets) -0.599 -0.560 0.038 3.9 
TFPQ -0.012 0.091 0.103 10.9*** 
# of observations 139 231   
Note: The pre-acquisition time period includes observations on up to 4 years prior to acquisition. “Early 
after acquisition” period includes 3 years immediately following acquisitions. “Late after acquisition” 
period includes years starting from year 4 after acquisitions. Nominal variables are deflated by the annual 
consumer price index. Details of variable construction are explained in Appendix E. ***, **, and * indicate 
that the corresponding difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 
percent level, respectively, using a double-sided t-test. 
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Table 6. Inventory and accrued payments to output value ratios: incumbent and acquired 











Inventory/produced output (C) 0.045 0.018 -0.027 -60.9*** 
Accrued revenues/produced output (D) 0.031 0.015 -0.017 -52.7*** 
Unrealized/produced output (C)+(D) 0.078 0.033 -0.045 -58.2*** 
# of observations 111 190   










Inventory/produced output (C) 0.046 0.013 -0.033 -71.6*** 
Accrued revenues/produced output (D) 0.030 0.019 -0.011 -36.0*** 
Unrealized/produced output (C)+(D) 0.078 0.031 -0.047 -60.3*** 
# of observations 134 101   










Inventory/produced output (C) 0.046 0.009 -0.038 -80.9*** 
Accrued revenues/produced output (D) 0.030 0.015 -0.015 -49.8*** 
Unrealized/produced output (C)+(D) 0.078 0.023 -0.054 -70.3*** 
# of observations 134 121   
 Note: The pre-acquisition time period includes observations on up to 4 years prior to acquisition. “Early 
after acquisition” period includes 3 years immediately following acquisitions. “Late after acquisition” 
period includes years starting from year 4 after acquisitions. *** indicates that the corresponding difference 
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, using a double-sided t-test. 
 
Table 7.  
Plant and firm perform metrics in 1898-1902 by in-network and out-of network firms 
 
Means Out-of-network (A) In-network (B) Difference (B-A) 
ROCE -0.005 0.044 0.049*** 
Unrealized output ratios 0.127 0.084 -0.043*** 
Spindle utilization rates 0.741 0.781 0.040** 
Output prices 85.4 77.5 -7.9** 













A. Data Description 
Our main data source is plant-level data collected annually by Japan’s prefectural 
governments. The collection of these data started in 1899, and until 1911 they were brought 
together and published nationally in a single source, the Statistical Yearbook of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce (Noshokomu Tokei Nempo). Even though the national government 
discontinued publishing these data after 1911, the subsequent data can still be found in prefectural 
statistical yearbooks. For this paper we have collected and processed all the available data 
between 1899 and 1920. 
The plant-level annual data record inputs used and output produced by each plant in a 
given year in physical units. In particular, the data contain the number of spindles in operation, 
number of days and average number of hours per day the plant operated, output of the finished 
product (cotton yarn) in physical units, the average count (measure of fineness) of produced yarn, 
the average monthly price per unit of yarn produced, the number of factory floor workers 
(subdivided into male and female workers), average daily wages separately for male and female 
workers, as well as the data on intermediate inputs, such as the consumption of raw cotton, type 
of engine(s) that powered the cotton spinning mill (steam, water, electrical or gas/kerosene), their 
total horsepower, etc. 
We supplement the plant-level data from prefectural governments’ statistics by several 
other data sources. In particular, we employed the data containing the same variables as above 
collected at the firm level by the All-Japan Cotton Spinners’ Association (hereafter “Boren,” 
using its name’s abbreviation in Japanese) and published in its monthly bulletin (Geppo). Even 
though the data were collected at the firm- and not plant level, there were no acquisitions and 
mergers to speak of until 1898 and all but 2 firms were single-plant firms, so the data are usable 
for pre-acquisition plant-level comparisons. We thus converted monthly Geppo data for 1896-
1898 to annual data and use these in our estimations alongside government-collected annual 
plant-level data for 1899 and beyond. 
With regard to data reliability, past literature has concluded that “the accuracy of these 
published numbers is unquestioned.” (Saxonhouse, 1971, p. 41). Nevertheless, we scrutinized 
these numbers ourselves and found occasional, unsystematic coding errors as well as obvious 
typos. We then used the overlap between the government-collected annual plant-level data and 
the firm-level monthly data published in Geppo to cross-check the data for single-plant firms. In 
the vast majority of cases we found that the annual data in statistical yearbooks and the 
annualized monthly data corresponded very closely (the discrepancy, if any, did not exceed a few 
percentage points). We were also able to use annualized monthly data to correct above-mentioned 
coding errors and typos in annual plant-level data in a significant number of cases. In the end, we 
have not been able clean the annual plant-level data in just about 5 percent of the total number of 
observations. We elected to drop such observations from our analysis.34
Each plant in the records is associated with the firm that owned it in a given year, 
making it possible to directly compare the plant’s physical (quantity) productivity before and after 
the change in ownership. This feature makes our data particularly attractive for analyzing plant 
productivity changes following ownership and/or management turnover. We also collected actual 
stories surrounding each acquisition and ownership turnover case, including but not limited to 
identities and backgrounds of the most important individuals involved (shareholders, top 
managers and engineers). Several data sources made this possible. First, almost 90 percent of the 
 
                                                 
34 To the best of our knowledge, we were the first to conduct this comprehensive cleaning of published 
plant-level records for the Japanese cotton spinning industry for 1896-1920. Our cleaned plant-level data 
tables and the details of the procedure outlined above are available upon request. 
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Japanese cotton spinning firms (and all significant firms) were public (joint stock) companies, 
obligated to issue shareholders’ reports every half a year. Copies of these reports were also sent to 
Boren’s headquarters in Osaka and those of them that have survived until the present day are 
currently hosted in the rare books section of Osaka University library. With the permission from 
the library we have photocopied the total of 1,292 reports on 149 firms, all what was available for 
the period from the early 1890s until 1920.35
We supplement these primary data sources by the information contained in the seven-
volume history of the industry written in the 1930s by the Japanese historian Taiichi Kinugawa 
(Kinugawa, 1964). The book is basically a collection of chapters each of which is dedicated to a 
particular firm, describing its background, evolution and major personnel involved since the firm 
entered the industry; in its totality, the chapters cover all but a few firms that entered the industry 
from its inception in the 1860s and until the beginning of the 20th century. While it appears that 
Kinugawa had access to the same company reports that we have (in particular, he cites as missing 
the same reports that we found missing in the Osaka University library), his book nevertheless 
provides us with a lot of additional insights because he was able to conduct interviews with many 
important individuals involved in those firms who were still alive at the time he wrote his book. 
Kinugawa also presents invaluable information about the background of most important 
shareholders and managers of each firm covered in his book as well as the storyline about how 
each firm was conceived. 
  Each report, in particular, contains a list of all 
shareholders and board members of the company issuing it, making it possible to see whether 
shareholders or top management teams had already been substantially overlapping even prior to 
the formal acquisition event and what were the new positions (if any) of major shareholders and 
top managers of acquired firms in the new integrated firms. Company reports also contain 
detailed balance sheets and profit-loss statements as well as qualitative information about 
shareholders’ meetings, deaths, illnesses, resignations and replacements of board members and so 
on, which we use as appropriate. 
Finally, we also used published company histories of firms that had survived until after 
World War II (some of them still surviving), although these are of less significance both because 
the information could be biased and because the level of detail is not nearly as great as in 
company reports or in Kinugawa’s history of the industry. Nevertheless, some qualitative 
information contained in those company histories proved to be usable and is used in this paper as 
appropriate. 
 While physical input and output data give us a unique chance to examine physical plant 
productivity as opposed to its revenue productivity, estimating the plant’s TFPQ still presented 
several challenges. First, even though cotton yarn is a relatively homogeneous product it still 
comes in varying degree of fineness, called “count.” 36
                                                 
35 While some of these company reports had been used in previous research by Japanese historians, we 
were the first to systematically digitalize them. The Osaka University library plans to launch a web site that 
will make our digital copies available in the public domain in the near future. 
  Output of cotton yarn in our data is 
measured in units of weight, but there is also information about the average count produced by a 
given plant in a given year. To make different counts comparable for the purpose of productivity 
36 The yarn count expresses the thickness of the yarn and its number indicates the length of yarn relative to 
the weight. The higher the count, the more yards are contained in the pound of yarn, so higher-count yarn is 
thinner (finer) than lower-count yarn. Producing higher-count (finer) yarn generally requires more skill and 
superior technology than producing lower-count (coarser) yarn. High-count yarn is often also improved 
further by more complex technological processes known as doubling, gassing, and so on, which were quite 
challenging for the fledgling Japanese cotton spinning mills to master at that time. 
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analysis, we converted them to the standard 20th count using a procedure in which we first 
estimated coefficients on different count dummies in the production function regression, with 
(log) output measured in weight as the dependent variable, including also (logged) spindle and 
worker input and year dummies. We then used the estimated coefficients on count dummies to 
convert output of other counts to the 20th count (details are available upon request). We also 
conducted all our estimations in an alternative way, using output in weight units and including the 
average count as a separate regressor when estimating the production function and confirmed that 
the results were similar. 
Second, the worker count data include blue-collar workers (by gender—male, “danko” 
and female, “joko”) but do not include white-collar workers (“shyain”). Hence, in our total factor 
productivity estimates, the residual should be interpreted as reflecting the managerial input in a 
broad sense, including the input of all white-collar personnel. As the data give us the number of 
male and female blue-collar workers separately, we used the plant-year-specific ratios of female 
to male wages to convert one unit of female labor to one unit of male labor.37
Finally, when estimating the production function we followed Saxonhouse (1971 and 
1977) and excluded intermediate inputs. The reason, already discussed by Saxonouse, is that the 
coefficient of transformation of raw cotton into cotton yarn is almost fixed, at least when both 
input and output are measured in weight units (the raw correlation in our data is 0.95), so it 
renders all other inputs economically and statistically insignificant in the production function. 
Raw cotton can be added to inputs without running into this problem when output is adjusted for 
count but such a procedure would still be problematic because finer counts of cotton yarn are 
typically produced from higher-quality raw cotton (e.g., American or Egyptian cotton instead of 
Indian cotton) and we do not have plant-level data about the type of raw cotton used. 
Nevertheless, we did check the robustness of our estimates to including the raw cotton input (and 
also engine horse power) with output adjusted for count and confirmed that the results pertaining 
to total factor-productivity presented in this paper still hold, although the estimated magnitude of 
the coefficients is reduced by about one half (most of them still retain statistical significance, 
however). 
  Third, while we 
have direct measures of capital input in the data in the form of the number of spindles in 
operation, spinning frames are just one part of capital equipment which accounts for 25-30 
percent of the total equipment cost of a mill (Saxonhouse, 1971, p. 55). Correlation between 
spindles and other equipment (cards, draw frames, slubbing frames, intermediate frames, roving 
frames, etc.) is, however, extremely high (over 95 percent), so “there is no question that spindles 
are a good proxy for equipment as a whole” (Saxonhouse, 1971, p. 56). We also have the data on 
the number of spindles installed in each plant in each year, which allows us to measure capacity 
utilization rates and follow any plant upgrades as the new equipment is installed. 
Finally, even though our data also contain records of the average number of hours plants 
operated per day in a given year, we elected to measure our inputs by worker- and spindle-days in 
the main specifications in this paper. As is well known, plants in Japan in this period operated in 
two shifts around or almost around the clock most of the time (e.g., Takamura, 1971), although 
occasionally the second shift would be suspended and the plant would operate only for half a day. 
                                                 
37 In the division of labor between sexes in Japanese cotton spinning mills, opening, mixing, carding, 
repairing and boiler room work were generally (although not exclusively) men’s jobs, while tending, 
drawing, roving and operating ring frames were generally women’s work (Clark, Cotton Goods in Japan, 
pp. 191-194, cited in Saxonhouse, 1971, p. 56). Using female to male wage ratios to aggregate the labor 
input assumes that wages reflect the marginal productivity of each sex. All our estimates are completely 
robust to using the number of male and female workers separately in the production function estimations. 
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Unfortunately, the information about average hours in operation reported in the annual plant-level 
data turned out to be rather inaccurate (in particular, there are large and apparently random 
discrepancies with the more accurate monthly firm-level data from firm reports in Geppo). We 
did repeat all the estimation below using the information on hours in operation and the results 
remained very much the same, with the impact of acquisitions on TFPQ even more strongly 
pronounced than reported in Tables 3 and 4 in the main text. 
 
B. An example of management turnover in our data 
In August 1898, the shareholders of the decade-old struggling Onagigawa Menpu 
(Onagigawa Cotton Fabrics) company in Tokyo, Japan appointed a new board member. His name 
was Heizaemon Hibiya, a cotton trader and also founder and CEO of Tokyo Gasu Boseki (Tokyo 
Gassed Cotton Spinning) company, one of the more recent and successful high-tech entrants in 
the Japanese cotton spinning industry at the time. When Hibiya first toured the Onagigawa factory, 
he was reportedly in shock at what he saw. Workers brought portable charcoal stoves and smoked 
inside the plant. Women cooked and ate on the factory floor, strewing garbage. Cotton and other 
materials were everywhere, blocking hallways, while workers in inventory room gambled. 
Managerial personnel were out at a nearby river fishing (Kinugawa, 1964, Vol. 5). 
 Hibiya, who was promoted to company president in early 1899, wasted no time in 
introducing much needed change. All work-unrelated and hazardous activities on factory 
premises were immediately banned. Plant deputy manager tried to stir workers’ unrest and was 
quickly fired, together with the head of the personnel department and the chief accountant (an off-
duty police officer was temporarily stationed inside the plant as a show of new management’s 
determination). But Hibiya did not stop at just introducing disciplinary measures. Even though he 
had another plant of his own to take care of, he and his right-hand man from Tokyo Gasu Boseki 
came to the Onagigawa factory and personally inspected equipment and checked output for 
defects on a daily basis, while also teaching workers how to do it on their own. During these 
visits, Hibiya reportedly engaged workers in conversations related to technology and production 
practices, taking questions, writing down those that he couldn’t answer immediately and coming 
back the next day with answers obtained from outside sources. Having determined that one 
reason for poor quality was that factory resources were spread too thinly, he concentrated 
production in just a few key areas, shutting down some workshops and switching from in-house 
production of finer counts of cotton yarn to procuring those from his other newer and more high-
tech plant. Other measures included selling older equipment and purchasing more modern 
machines. 
The above account reads remarkably similar to the description of the experiment in 
modern Indian textile industry conducted by Bloom et al. (2013). The results of Hibiya’s 
restructuring effort were also equally or perhaps even more impressive. Using our data described 
in detail below, we estimate that the plant’s TFPQ relative to the industry average more than 
doubled in the 3 years after Hibiya took over compared to 3 years before that while labor 
productivity (measured as output in physical units per worker-hours) increased on average by 70 
percent. Over the same period, labor productivity in two other comparable plants in the same 
Tokyo area increased by just 6 percent. It is also worth noting that Hibiya was not part of an 
international aid effort; he was hired through an internal decision-making process of the 
shareholders, dishing out their own money.38
                                                 
38 Hibiya’s story is typical of industrialization pioneers in Japan and shows how much it was a land of 
opportunity at the time. Born Kichijiro Ohshima, third child of the owner of a hotel in a small provincial 




C. Acquisitions over time and the concentration of ownership in 3 largest firms, 1898-1920. 
Table A1. Number of acquired plants by year 
Year 
Number of 




Fraction of total 
number of 
acquisitions 
1896 0 0.000 0 0.000 
1897 0 0.000 0 0.000 
1898 1 0.012 0 0.000 
1899 5 0.060 0 0.000 
1900 7 0.085 3 0.429 
1901 1 0.012 0 0.000 
1902 2 0.025 1 0.500 
1903 15 0.188 7 0.467 
1904 2 0.025 0 0.000 
1905 3 0.038 0 0.000 
1906 5 0.062 3 0.600 
1907 11 0.136 6 0.545 
1908 2 0.025 0 0.000 
1909 1 0.011 0 0.000 
1910 1 0.012 0 0.000 
1911 6 0.069 4 0.667 
1912 5 0.057 2 0.400 
1913 0 0.000 0 0.000 
1914 0 0.000 0 0.000 
1915 4 0.038 2 0.500 
1916 5 0.048 2 0.400 
1917 3 0.028 0 0.000 
1918 11 0.100 7 0.636 
1919 3 0.026 0 0.000 
1920 2 0.017 0 0.000 
Total 
 
95 0.043 37 0.389 
Note: Largest acquirers are Kanebo, Mie Boseki, Osaka Boseki, Settsu Boseki and Amabo. 
Excluding 15 plants that were consolidated in 1914 in the equal merger between Mie Boseki and 
Osaka Boseki. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
was 13 and went to Tokyo to become the trader’s apprentice. At the age of 20 he was doing trades on his 
own. He went on to grow one the most successful cotton trading houses in the Tokyo area, while also 
playing a major role in several prominent cotton spinning and other firms and eventually becoming vice-
chairman of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce. 
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Figure A1. Ownership concentration in three largest firms 
 
Note: The figure depicts the evolution of the fraction of plants owned by the three largest firms in 
1920 (Kanebo, Toyobo, Dainippon Boseki) and these plants’ capacity and output as a fraction of 
the industry total. Toyobo data include that of its predecessor firms (Osaka Boseki and Mie 
Boseki) prior to their 1914 merger. Dainippon Boseki includes the data of its predecessor firms 
(Amabo and Settsu Boseki) prior to their 1918 merger. 
 
D. Evidence of capital vintage effects as reflected in machine characteristics 
 We extracted the data on a number of specific orders made by Japanese cotton spinning 
firms during our sample for capital equipment from British suppliers from the general file on 
world-wide orders from British manufacturers in 1879-1933 compiled by Gary Saxonhouse and 
archived at the ICSPR (Wright, 2011).39
This yielded a file of vintage-specific machine characteristics for each year in our data. 
We then merged this file with our main data file which contains vintage age of machines in all 
plants (calculated as the weighted average of spindle capacity installed in a given year—in 
practice we subtract one year from the year machines were equipped to allow for delivery and 
installation time). This makes it possible to assign average vintage-year characteristics (1)-(5) 
 We used these data to measure the average values of 
numerous technical characteristics of the machines that were shipped in each year. These 
characteristics are (1) average spindle speed (sometimes highest and lowest speeds are also 
available but mostly the data are on average speed); (2) average (and also highest and lowest) 
count of cotton yarn to produce which the machine was designed for; (3) number of spindles per 
frame; (4) how many different types of raw cotton the machine was designed to work with (from 
1 to 4); and (5) dummies equal to 1 if the machine was designed to work with Indian cotton and 0 
otherwise, and the same for American and Egyptian cotton (the omitted category would be 
machines designed to work only with inferior-quality Japanese or Chinese cotton). 
                                                 
39 We thank Patrick McGuire for helping us with these data. 
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above to all individual plants in our data. 
Table A2 shows the degree of technological progress in machine characteristics from an 
early vintage to a later vintage during the first waves of large-scale entry into the Japanese cotton 
spinning industry. Even though we have the data by each year, there are just a few orders prior to 
1887, at which point orders pick up (14 in 1887, 16 in 1888, and 11 in 1889). There are only 8 
orders in 1890 and only 2 orders in 1891, but the orders pick up again, and quite dramatircally so 
staring in 1892; there were 14 orders in that year, 25 in 1893, 35 in 1894, 18 in 1895, 39 in 1896 
and 24 in 1897. Despite this large number of observations, machine characteristics are 
remarkably similar throughout these later years, so we lump them all together into the single 
1892-97 vintage. (t-tests on mean differences across different subperiods within this period were 
all insignificant.)  
The differences in average characteristics of the machines belonging to pre-1892 
vintage where our first cohort firms (started operating prior to 1892) entered the industry and the 
later vintage which was ordered by the second cohort of entrants (and also by those of the first-
cohort firms that attempted to modernize) are rather large and are all statistically significant at the 
1 percent level using double-sided t-test. We also used 1890 or 1891 as the cutoff year and the 
results were basically the same. 
 
Table A2. Average machine characteristics by two vintages 
  Pre-1892 vintage 1892-97 vintage 
Spindle rotation speed (RPM x 1000) 7.10 7.71 
Cotton yarn count designed for 17.53 19.96 
Number of spindles per ring frame 332.25 377.71 
Number of cotton types designed for 1.06 2.47 
Designed for Indian cotton 0.00 0.56 
Designed for US cotton 0.04 0.44 
 
Along all dimensions, the newer machines embody more technological capabilities.  
First, the increase in spindle rotation speed means that the same number of spindles operating the 
same number of hours can produce more cotton yarn if employed at full speed. The differences in 
average speed over the period would allow output per operating spindle to increase by 6.4 percent.  
However, on top of this there was also an 11.4 percent increase in the count of cotton yarn 
machines are designed for, resulting in a total potential boost to count adjusted output per spindle 
of 17.8 percent. The number of spindles per frame also increased from the older to the newer 
vintage, by 8 percent. Because the frame size remains the same, it is reasonable to assume that the 
same amount of workers attend to one frame as before (or at least the number of workers 
attending to a frame does not grow anywhere near proportionately to the increase in the number 
of spindles and their speed), resulting in a potential of up to 8 percent improvement in labor 
productivity per machine from spindle density. Finally, the newer machines were more versatile. 
While older machines were almost exclusively designed to work with just one type of cotton 
(Japanese or Chinese), new machines could work with an average of 2.47 cotton types. Moreover, 
about half of the new machines were designed to work with Indian or US cotton as compared to 
virtually none of the older machines. 
As already mentioned, second-cohort entrants all had access to these new and better 
machines. However, first-cohort entrants—especially those of them who later became our 
acquiring firms—also ordered new machines and gradually removed old machines from service. 
Therefore, the gap in machine quality between different firm types is not as dramatic as the 
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difference in vintages may indicate, but it is still considerable as shown in Table A3.  Table A3 
follows the same format as Table 1 in the main text, but it shows differences in machine 
characteristics and therefore differences in potential rather than actual productivity across these 
categories (recall that these figures are computed for 1896-97, when no acquisition had yet taken 
place). 
 
Table A3. Technical characteristics of machines by types of plants, 1896-97 
    Acquiring plants Acquired plants Exiting plants 




cohort   
Spindle rotation speed 
(RPM x 1000) 
Mean 7.46 7.44 7.70 7.01 
(SD) 0.34 0.29 0.14 0.33 
Cotton yarn count 
designed for 
Mean 18.57 18.35 20.32 17.80 
(SD) 1.46 1.87 2.24 0.84 
Number of spindles 
per ring frame 
Mean 365.91 357.01 379.92 314.69 
(SD) 22.58 33.43 8.60 47.46 
Number of cotton 
types designed for 
Mean 1.89 1.57 2.48 1.29 
(SD) 0.69 0.70 0.22 0.61 
Designed for Indian 
cotton 
Mean 0.32 0.17 0.59 0.11 
(SD) 0.30 0.25 0.15 0.25 
Designed for US 
cotton 
Mean 0.28 0.21 0.43 0.11 
(SD) 0.24 0.25 0.13 0.14 
Observations 32 31 38 23 
Notes: See Table 1 in our main text. 
 
 Comparing newer (second-cohort) future acquired plants to future acquiring plants, we 
can see that the average spindle rotation speed was about 3.3 percent higher among newer plants, 
while the count they were designed to produce was about 9.4 percent higher (both differences are 
statistically highly significant). Together, thus, potential increase in count-adjusted output due to 
machine superiority alone was 12.7 percent. The increase in the number of spindles per ring 
frame was 3.8 percent, again statistically highly significant, and there are huge differences in 
machines’ versatility (number of cotton types they can work with and the fraction designed to 
work with better-quality imported cotton). Again, as we saw in the main text, exiting plants are 
the worst on all aspects in these technical characteristics (which is also reflected in very old 
equipment age of those plants in Table 1 in the main text). 
Thus we have direct evidence of technological superiority of younger future acquired 
plants compared to future acquiring plants in those years.  In the language of our model, the 
younger plants’ omega was indeed higher (by 13-16 percent overall perhaps) than that of the 
acquiring plants. The fact that acquired plants didn’t exhibit big TFPQ differences compared to 
acquiring plants before their acquisition (even though they did exhibit this difference in 1896-97, 
which were very good years for the industry without few worries about demand management) 
suggests that after the onset of industry-wide demand problems starting around 1898, these plants 
started squandering their potential productivity advantage. It was only regained after acquisition 
and the influence of new management. 
 
E. Construction of plant-level profitability measure 
We construct a plant-level analogue to ROCE (return on capital employed) according to the 
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following procedure. Output of cotton yarn, output price, and the number of male and female 
work-days as well as the corresponding daily wages are observed directly at the plant level. 
Capital cost is defined as the sum of depreciation and interest cost of debt. For deprecation, we 
use firm-level accounting data and a standard depreciation rate of 0.05 to compute the amount of 
depreciation of fixed capital, and we assign it to each plant in a multiple-plant firm in proportion 
to the plant’s installed capacity in the firm capacity. The interest cost of borrowed capital is 
imputed to each plant as its share of the firm-level interest-bearing debt, multiplied by the 
economy-wide interest rate (proxied by the Bank of Japan discount rate), times 1.31. The latter 
number is the coefficient on the economy-wide interest rate estimated from a regression using all 
available firm-level data, with actual interest payments to the amount of interest-bearing debt 
reported in firms’ accounting statements as the independent variable, and economy-wide interest 
rate and year dummies as the explanatory variables (the estimated coefficient is statistically 
highly significant). 
To complete the construction of plant-level ROCE, we also need a proxy for the margin 
on the gross value of output (parameter  in the first decomposition equation (4) in the main 
text). To this effect, we in turn need to estimate the cost of intermediate input (raw cotton) and 
other non-labor operation expenses (packing, shipping, engine fueling, etc.). Since there were 
also markets for yarn and raw cotton wasted in the production process and subsequently 
recovered, we also need to add the amount of sales of waste yarn and recovered waste cotton as 
those are the by-products of the spinning process. 
As already mentioned, the production of cotton yarn uses the main input of raw cotton 
in almost fixed proportion to output (the coefficient of correlation between output of cotton yarn 
and input of raw cotton, both measured in physical units, is 0.997 for our acquired plants both 
before and after acquisitions). Data from profit-loss statements suggest that non-labor expenses 
were also a more less constant fraction of sales. We thus assume a fraction of intermediate inputs 
and other operational expenses in the value of output to be a common parameter for all plants, 
and we calculate it from available firm-level profit-loss statements. Physical volume of waste 
yarn and recovered raw cotton are observed at the plant level, and we estimate the sales of these 
by-products by multiplying these amounts by the available data on their yearly market prices. The 
main parameters obtained in this way are presented in Table A13, and they lead to calculated 





                                                 
40 While we assume these to be the same for all firms, it is possible that less successful future acquired 
firms may have had higher (non-wage) operating costs than future acquiring firms. Available data from 
company profit-loss statements do not, however, indicate that this was the case. Future acquired firms may 
have also faced higher interest rates on their borrowings than more successful future acquiring firms. Based 
on available data from company reports, we cannot reject this possibility; the ratio of interest payments to 
the amount of borrowing is indeed considerably (and statistically significantly) higher for target firms in 
pre-acquisition years than for the firms that eventually acquired them in the same years. The impact of this 
on our overall profitability differential measure is fairly small, but inasmuch as it is present, our plant-level 
ROCE measure would actually understate the profitability disadvantage of acquired plants relative to plants 
of acquiring firms. The decomposed differentials reported in the main text should therefore be considered 
lower bounds.  
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Table A4. Parameters in cost calculations 
Cotton input to output ratio 1.162 
Relative cotton price 0.677 
Waste yarn to output ratio 0.012 
Relative waste yarn price 0.294 
Recovered cotton to input ratio 0.113 
Relative recovered cotton price 0.438 
Net input cost to total output value ratio 0.746 
Non-labor operating expenses rate 0.105 
Margin before labor and capital cost 0.150 
 
The plant-level ROCE measure obtained in this way (and winsorized at the top 2 
percent) is highly correlated with firm-level ROCE measure available for pre-acquisition years 
(the coefficient of correlation is 0.75). Figure A2 plots the density of plant-level ROCE 
distribution and the corresponding firm-level ROCE in the whole sample, and visually confirms 




 Distributions of constructed plant-level ROCE measure and ROCE from firm accounts  
(all plants and years) 
 
 
F. Robustness Checks 
In this section we describe the details of the design and the results of robustness checks 
summarized in Section 4.6 of the main text. 
We are interested in estimating the following parameters: 
𝛽1 = 1𝑁𝑀∑ � 1#𝑚𝑖 ∑ 𝜔𝑗�𝑦𝑗𝑎𝐶 − 𝑦𝑗𝑏𝐶 �𝑗∈𝑚𝑖 �𝑖∈𝑀      (A1) 
𝛽2 = 1𝑁𝑀 ∑ �𝑦𝑖𝑏𝐴 − 1#𝑚𝑖 𝜔𝑗 ∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑏𝐶𝑗∈𝑚𝑖 �𝑖∈𝑀       (A2) 
𝛽3 = 1𝑁𝑀 ∑ ��𝑦𝑖𝑎𝐴 − 𝑦𝑖𝑏𝐴 � − 1#𝑚𝑖 ∑ 𝜔𝑗�𝑦𝑗𝑎𝐶 − 𝑦𝑗𝑏𝐶 �𝑗∈𝑚𝑖 �𝑖∈𝑀     (A3) 
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where 𝑀 is a set of matches, and acquired plant i is matched with “comparison” plants to form 
match 𝑚𝑖. Outcome variables 𝑦𝑖𝑏𝐴  are the physical TFPQ measures of acquired plant i and the (log 
of) the plant gross operating surplus rate (GOS) of acquired plant i before an acquisition event, 
and outcome variables 𝑦𝑗𝑏𝐴  are these variables after the acquisition event. Superscript C indicates 
the corresponding variables for comparison plants. 𝑁𝑀 is the total number of matches, #𝑚𝑖 is the 
number of comparison plants within match 𝑚𝑖 , and 𝜔𝑗  is a weight attached to the outcome 
variables, 𝑦𝑗𝑎𝐶  and 𝑦𝑗𝑏𝐶 . 
The parameters 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 can be estimated by  
 𝑦�𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖 × 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (A4) 
where 𝑦�𝑖𝑡 is the outcome variable of plant i at time t if it belongs to a group of acquired plants. 
The outcome variables of comparison plants within the match 𝑚𝑖  are collapsed to 𝑦�𝑖𝑡 =
∑ 𝜔𝑗𝑦𝑗𝑗∈𝑚𝑖 , the weighted average of outcomes of comparison plants within the match 𝑚𝑖. The 
variable AAit is a dummy equal to 1 if acquisition mi happened prior to year t and zero otherwise, 
while the variable Acquiredi is equal to 1 if plant i is purchased in acquisition case mi and zero 
otherwise. µt is an acquisition-year fixed effect. The estimate ?̂?3  reflects the post-acquisition 




F.1 Alternative TFPQ measures 
In the main text, we used TFPQ estimates obtained as residuals from a production 
function estimated via OLS to compare outcomes of acquired and incumbent plants. As already 
mentioned, the classic “transmission bias” problem of a correlation between unobserved 
productivity shocks and producers’ input choices may cause OLS estimates to be biased. 
Therefore we also ran our specifications using TFPQ values constructed via four alternative 
methods designed to avoid transmission bias. 
Our basic specification of the production function is given by 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where qit is plant’s logged output, lit is the plant’s logged number of composite worker-days, kit is 
its number of spindle-days in operation, xit is a vector of control variables that include the change 
in log plant capacity from the previous year and (logged) age of the plant’s machines, and 𝜇𝑡 are 
year dummies. The first measure of TFPQ is residuals from the OLS regression of the production 
function as in the main text. The second measure utilizes residuals from the Wooldridge (2009) 
GMM estimation method where a proxy variable is included to control for unobserved firm-level 
productivity shocks. This method is a generalization of earlier approaches using investment 
(Olley and Pakes, 1996) or intermediate inputs (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) as proxy variables, 
but it allows for the use of any proxy variable that is positively associated with unobserved 
productivity (Woodridge, 2009). In our case, as implied also by our theoretical mechanism, we 
can employ capacity utilization rate (a variable not normally available to an econometrician) as 
such a proxy. Our second measure of TFPQ (Wooldridge) is thus the residual from the production 
function estimation by the Wooldridge (2009) GMM method with the (logged) capacity 
utilization rate serving as the proxy variable. To construct the third measure of TFPQ we follow 
the system GMM approach proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Specifically, we conduct a 
                                                 
41 We can also write equations (1) to (3) as 𝛽1 = 1𝑁𝑀 ∑ �𝑦�𝑚𝑖𝑎𝐶 − 𝑦�𝑚𝑖𝑏𝐶 �𝑖∈𝑀 , 𝛽2 = 1𝑁𝑀 ∑ �𝑦𝑖𝑏𝐴 − 𝑦�𝑚𝑖𝑏𝐶 �𝑖∈𝑀 , and 𝛽3 = 1𝑁𝑀 ∑ �(𝑦𝑖𝑎𝐴 − 𝑦𝑖𝑏𝐴 ) − �𝑦�𝑚𝑖𝑎𝐶 − 𝑦�𝑚𝑖𝑏𝐶 ��𝑖∈𝑀 . These expressions give us an interpretation of the parameters similar to the one from the standard dif-in-dif estimations. 
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two-step implementation of the Blundell and Bond estimator with two-period lags, treating the 
number of worker- and spindle-days as endogenous variables, alongside with output, and 
generating GMM-style instruments for them. The estimations again include also year dummies, 
the change in log plant capacity from the previous year, and (logged) age of the plant’s machines 
as additional instruments. Finally, we construct the fourth measure of TFPQ by using the standard 
index approach. We calculate the ratio of labor cost to revenue for each firm and use its industry 
average as the labor elasticity. We compute the capital elasticity by subtracting the labor elasticity 
from 1.  
 
F.2 Same owner matching 
We construct two different matched samples to estimate equation (A4). In the first 
matched sample, which is the one we use in the main text, a match is made based on whether an 
incumbent plant of an acquiring firm belongs to the same owner who acquired plant i. Thus, 
comparison plants of acquired plant i are incumbent plants that had been managed by the same 
owner who acquired the plant i. We call this matched sample “Same owner matching” sample. 
For this matched sample, we use two different weights to estimate (A4). In the main text, 
we use a simple weight by setting 𝜔𝑗 = 1 for all j so that all incumbent plants of an acquiring 
firm carry an equal weight. The other weight is the kernel weight. We calculate the distance 
between an acquired plant and each incumbent plant within the match by using mahalanobis 
distance. Plant size, plant age, and plant location are used to calculate this distance. Then, we 
generate a weight for an incumbent plant by using this distance and normal kernel. A large weight 
is assigned to an incumbent plant when it is similar to the acquired plant in terms of these 
variables. 
Tables A5 and A6 report estimation results using this matched sample with different 
weighting schemes as above. For comparison, we also include results from the standard 
difference-in-difference estimation where we just ignore matching. All specifications include 
acquisition and calendar year fixed effects, as in the main text.  
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Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the acquisition-case level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
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Table A7 presents the estimation results using different measures of TFPQ as described in 
Section F.1 and simple weights (results using other types of weights are similar). The main results 
are robust to alternative weights and alternative measures of TFPQ.  
 
Table A7: Estimation Results from Same owner matching –Several TFPQ measures 
  All acquisitions and Simple weights 
  Dependent variable: TFPQ 
  OLS Wooldridge Blundell-Bond Index 
After acquisition -0.034 0.064** -0.045** 0.065** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.018) (0.026) 
Acquired plant 0.025 -0.023 0.018 -0.079** 
 
(0.035) (0.033) (0.024) (0.031) 
After acquisition x 
Acquired plant 
0.096** 0.096*** 0.082*** 0.111*** 
(0.036) (0.035) (0.025) (0.034) 
Constant 0.036 2.441*** 0.075*** -2.276*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) 
Observations 1,413 1,413 1,332 1,460 
 
F.3 Pre-acquisition characteristics and trend matching 
While matching on the same ultimate owner seems to be the most natural procedure in 
our case, we also created an alternative matched sample to estimate equation (A4) by forming 
matches based on whether a non-acquired plant is similar to acquired plant i in terms of pre-
acquisition characteristics or pre-acquisition trends of outcome variables. To construct this 
matched sample, we first specify a group of non-acquired plants that could be potentially matched 
with each acquired plant. Potential non-acquired plants include all those plants that were owned 
by acquiring firms and were never acquired themselves, but it also includes plants of firms that 
just did not participate in the acquisition process at all and also previously or future acquired 
plants far enough from the time they were actually acquired so that we can consider them to be 
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not affected by acquisition events.42 Then, we calculate a distance between a particular acquired 
plant and each non-acquired plant by using mahalanobis distance. Two sets of variables are used 
for calculating mahalanobis distance. One set is pre-acquisition average value of plant size, plant 
age, and plant location. The other set is pre-acquisition average value of TFPQ growth and plant 
ROCE growth. We calculated TFPQ growth rates of each plant by using the four measures of 
TFPQ and use them to calculate mahalanobis distance. Thus, a small value of this distance 
indicates that an acquired plant and a non-acquired plant are similar with respect to pre-
acquisition TFPQ growth rates. In a similar way, growth rates of the plant-level return on capital 
employed (plant ROCE) are used to calculate mahalanobis distance. After calculating these 
distances, a non-acquired plant is included in a particular match only if its distance is below the 
median distance of the overall sample. 43
Tables A8, A9, and A10 present estimation results using this matched sample. Table A11 
shows estimation results for the ratio of plant-level inventory to output, the ratio of fixed capital 
cost to output, days in operation, and capacity utilization rate. The main results are robust to 
alternative matching criteria and alternative measures of TFPQ.  
 The simple weight (i.e., 𝜔𝑗 = 1 ) is used for this 
estimation. 
 
Table A8: Estimation Results from pre characteristics and trend matching – All acquisitions 
 All acquisitions 



















































































                                                 
42 More specifically, acquired plants in 3 years prior to and 5 years after their own acquisition events are 
excluded. A plant was also excluded when it does not have any usable observation both before or after the 
acquisition event. 
43 Other cutoff values such as the mean and lower quartile are used for this estimation, and the results 
remain unchanged qualitatively.    
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Table A9: Estimation Results from pre characteristics and trend matching – Serial acquirers 
 
Serial acquirers 
Matching criteria Plant age, size, location  
TFPQ 
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After acquisition -0.020** 0.083*** -0.015*** 0.084*** 
 
(0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) 
Acquired plant -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 -0.011 
 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) 
After acquisition x 
Acquired plant 
0.080*** 0.079*** 0.060*** 0.087*** 
(0.028) (0.026) (0.019) (0.025) 
Constant 0.046*** 2.386*** 0.019*** -2.406*** 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011) 
Observations 11,521 11,521 10,591 11,607 
 
F.4 Placebo test 
We also performed a simple placebo test to check that our main findings are not 
spurious. We randomly assign acquisition status to plants in our sample and estimate how the 
outcome variables are related to this randomly generated acquisition status. More specifically, we 
use the same owner matched sample 44
                                                 
44 The results were qualitatively unchanged if we conduct the same placebo test using a pre characteristics 
and trend matched sample. 
 and generate a random variable from the uniform 
distribution for each plant in the whole matched sample. We assign an acquired plant status to a 
plant that obtained the maximum value within a particular match. Then, we estimate parameters 
in equation (4) by using all acquisition cases and simple weights. We repeat this procedure at 
1000 times, and calculate a sample mean of estimated coefficients from 1000 time simulations, 
and their standard errors. 
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Table A11: Placebo test  
 
TFPQ 
 Mean Std. Err 95% Conf. Interval 
After acquisition -0.0138 0.0004 -0.0146 -0.0129 
Acquired plant -0.0004 0.0010 -0.0024 0.0017 
After acquisition x Acquired plant 0.0037 0.0011 0.0015 0.0058 
Constant 0.0624 0.0005 0.0614 0.0634 
 
Plant ROCE 
 Mean Std. Err 95% Conf. Interval 
After acquisition 0.0151 0.0003 0.0145 0.0157 
Acquired plant -0.0032 0.0005 -0.0041 -0.0023 
After acquisition x Acquired plant 0.0033 0.0006 0.0022 0.0045 
Constant 0.1042 0.0002 0.1038 0.1047 
 
Table A11 reports the results from this placebo test. The magnitudes of acquisition and 
its interaction with the after acquisition dummy effects on outcome variables approach toward 
zero, and they are economically insignificant.  
 
G. More Decompositions and Input Utilization Details 
We can express the logged ratio of total combined capital and input to shareholders’ 
invested capital (the middle term on the right-hand side of equation (4) in the main text) as the 
sum of two logged ratios: 
, 
where Mi is plant i’s total available annual capacity (the number of spindles in installed machines, 
times 365 days). 
The results of this decomposition are presented in Table A12. The top panel indicates 
that higher combined input to total assets ratios among incumbent plants are mostly explained by 
higher ratios of combined input to available capacity, the first term on the right-hand side of the 
decomposition equation above. Given that we measure both capital and labor inputs as flows 
conditional on operation, this ratio reflects capacity utilization rates—the rates of capital services 
extracted from the installed machine capacity and the corresponding rates of labor services 
applied to this capacity. The bottom panels of the table indicate that this capacity utilization 
metric jumps 9 percent in acquired plants in the first few years after acquisition and by more than 
16 percent in the long run. Thus acquisitions immediately lead to higher rates of employment of 
available capital resources (and correspondingly higher employment of labor, as can be seen from 
the increases in total labor cost per total assets for acquired plants in Table 6). Ratios of capacity 
to total assets, on the other hand, are statistically indistinguishable in pre-acquisition years 
between incumbent and future acquired plants.  Moreover, these ratios change little in acquired 
plants after they are bought, and indeed actually fall in the long run (which, once again, reflects 




Table A12. Decomposition of plants’ total input to total assets ratios:  










ln(total input/total assets) -0.654 -0.406 0.248 28.1*** 
of which:     
ln(total input/plant capacity) -2.564 -2.391 0.174 19.0*** 
ln(plant capacity/total assets) 1.910 1.984 0.074 7.7 
# of observations 115 205   
     
Pre- and early post- acquisition 









ln(total input/total assets) -0.599 -0.456 0.143 15.4** 
of which:     
ln(total input/plant capacity) -2.552 -2.463 0.089 9.3*** 
ln(plant capacity/total assets) 1.953 2.007 0.054 5.6 
# of observations 137 130   
     
Pre- and late post- acquisition 









ln(total input/total assets) -0.599 -0.560 0.038 3.9 
of which:     
ln(total input/plant capacity) -2.552 -2.401 0.151 16.3*** 
ln(plant capacity/total assets) 1.953 1.841 -0.112 -10.6*** 
# of observations 137 231   
Note: The pre-acquisition time period includes observations on up to 4 years prior to acquisition. 
“Early after acquisition” period includes 3 years immediately following acquisitions. “Late after 
acquisition” period includes years starting from year 4 after acquisitions. Details of variable 
construction are explained in the Appendix. . ***, **, and * indicate that the corresponding 
difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent level, 
respectively, using a double-sided t-test. 
 
The differences in the combined input actually deployed in the production process 
discussed in the main text can be measured even more directly in our data by looking at a plant’s 
spindles utilization rate (defined as the number of total spindle-days the plant operated during a 
given year divided by the product of the plant’s number of spindles installed and 365 days). Table 
A13 presents this measure separately for acquired and incumbent plants in the four years 
preceding an acquisition. We also look at the same difference for two labor-capital ratios: one 
divides the plant’s total worker-days by its machine capacity (the number of spindles installed 
times 365 days), and the other divides it by the actual number of spindle-days the plant operated 
during a given year. 
The top two rows in Table A13 show that both spindle and labor utilization of machine 
capacity are significantly higher, by about 12-13 percent, among incumbent plants than in 
acquired plants before acquisition.  Our production function estimates suggest modest increasing 
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returns to scale (the sum of the log spindle-days and work-days coefficients is 1.12). Hence the 
implied output differential per unit of machine capacity is 14-15 percent, which accounts for most 
of the differential in the input-to-capacity ratios in Table 8. In contrast, to these capacity 
utilization differences, acquiring and acquired plants operating capital-labor ratios were 
essentially the same before acquisition. This further confirms the findings that, conditional on 
operating, the plants operated in similar ways. These results also indicate that the 50 percent 
higher wage cost rate per unit of shareholders’ equity observed among incumbent plants in the 
first ROCE decomposition in Table 4 in the main text is largely a reflection of higher employment 
rates, not just higher wages per worker. Daily real wages of both male and female workers (not 
shown) were also about 14-15 percent higher in incumbent than in acquired plants. 
 
Table A13.  








Spindles utilization rate 0.851 0.755 12.6*** 
Labor to capacity ratio 0.015 0.017 12.3*** 
Labor to operating spindles ratio 0.020 0.020 -0.5 
# of observations 171 227  
Note: The pre-acquisition time period includes observations on up to 4 years prior to acquisition 
event. Spindle utilization rates are computed as the total number of spindle-days the plant 
operated during a year, divided by the total spindle capacity (the product of the total number of 
spindles installed and 365 days). Labor to capacity ratio is the number of worker-days in a given 
year divided by the total spindle capacity. Labor to operating spindles ratio is the number of 
worker-days in a given year divided by the total number of spindle-days the plant operated during 
a year. *** indicates that the corresponding difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent 




H. In- and out-of-network firms distribution densities of ROCE, unrealized output rates, capacity 
utilization and prices 
Figure A3. Return on capital employed, 1898-1902 
 
 














I. Proofs of the results in Section 5 
Proof that u = v at the optimum (equation (10) in the main text) 
 
The two first order conditions for the maximization of (9) are given by: 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑢
= 0 ⇒ �𝑝 − 1
√𝑢𝑣𝜔






= 0 ⇒ �𝑝 − 1
√𝑢𝑣𝜔
� = (𝛾 − 𝑢 − 𝑣) 1
2𝑣√𝑢𝑣𝜔
. 
The claim follows immediately. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1(i): Straightforward from (10) and (12) in the main text. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1(ii): We have  
































� > 0. 







, which is also clearly 
increasing in 𝛾. 
 








Proof of Proposition 1: Denote the highest bid price for a potential target plant of quality 𝜔 by 
𝛿𝜋(𝜔, 𝛾𝐻), where 𝛿 ∈ [0,1)   captures any possible transfer costs (rent dissipation) associated with 
an acquisition. This highest bid price is thus the profit that a manager with ability 𝛾𝐻 can obtain 
by taking over this plant. The lowest asking price, on the other hand, is given by 𝜋(𝜔, 𝛾𝐿). 
Assuming that the actual price will be somewhere in-between, an acquisition will be 
consummated whenever  
𝛿𝜋(𝜔, 𝛾𝐻) > 𝜋(𝜔, 𝛾𝐿).        (A.4) 
Lemma 1(iii) implies that potential gains from an acquisition will be higher if 𝜔 is higher, 
so, other things equal, condition (A.4) is more likely to be met if the potential target is owned by 
a recent entrant (with quality 𝜔2) than if it is owned by a first-cohort entrant (with quality 𝜔1). 
Condition (A.4) also implies that for any plant quality, an acquisition is more likely to happen 
when the difference between 𝛾𝐻 and 𝛾𝐿 is large. Once again, this is more likely to happen when 
an incumbent (first-cohort) firm meets a new entrant (second-cohort) firm than when two 
incumbents meet. Also, since the ability level of new entrants never exceeds that of incumbents, 
new entrants never act as acquirers. 45
 
 




 for any given 𝜔. We have: 





Differentiating with respect to 𝛾 yields 
                                                 
45 In reality there were a few cases in our data where new entrants acted as acquirers in the industry. 
However, in all these cases the acquiring entrants were actually spinoffs from firms of early entry cohort, 































because 𝑝𝛾𝜔 − 2 = ��𝑝𝛾𝜔 + √2���𝑝𝛾𝜔 − √2� > 0 by (13) in the main text. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  
Let subscripts A and T denote acquiring and target plants, respectively. The TFPQ difference 







.       (A.5) 
The difference in profits between the acquiring and target plants, on the other hand, is given by 
�𝑝𝛾𝐴 + 2𝜔𝐴 − 2�2𝑝𝛾𝐴𝜔𝐴 � − �𝑝𝛾𝑇 + 2𝜔𝑇 − 2�2𝑝𝛾𝑇𝜔𝑇 � 
= 𝑝(𝛾𝐴 − 𝛾𝑇) + � 2𝜔𝐴 − 2𝜔𝑇� − 2��2𝑝𝛾𝐴𝜔𝐴 − �2𝑝𝛾𝑇𝜔𝑇 � = 𝑝(𝛾𝐴 − 𝛾𝑇) + 2 � 1𝜔𝐴 �1 −�2𝑝𝛾𝐴𝜔𝐴� − 1𝜔𝑇 �1 −�2𝑝𝛾𝑇𝜔𝑇��.   (A.6) 
Assume now that the difference (A.5) above is zero. This means that the difference (A.6) boils 
down to  
𝑝(𝛾𝐴 − 𝛾𝑇) + 2 � 1𝜔𝐴 − 1𝜔𝑇� > 0, 
which is positive because by Proposition 1, 𝛾𝐴 > 𝛾𝑇, while 𝜔𝑇 > 𝜔𝐴 by the assumption that the 
target plant has higher quality. We have thus shown that if the TFPQ of the acquiring and target 
plants are the same, the profit of the acquiring firm will be higher than the profit of the target firm 
(this also follows directly from Proposition 3, of course). By continuity, the profit of the acquiring 
firm will still be higher than that of the target firm even for some range of parameters where 
TFPQ(acquirer) < TFPQ(target). It is also clear from the expression above that this range will be 
larger when the difference 𝛾𝐴 − 𝛾𝑇 is larger. 
 
J. A Numerical Example of the Model 
Set the value of model’s parameters as follows: 𝑝 = 3,𝜔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 = 1.5,𝜔𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 =1, 𝛾0 = 2. Assume that surviving incumbents’ ability, 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡, is uniformly distributed over 
the interval [2.45,3.5]. The choice of the lower bound in the distribution of 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡  makes 
sure that the lowest-ability incumbent attains the same profits as all entrants, while the upper 
bound gives the highest-ability incumbent the profit that is twice as large as entrants’ profits. 
Under these parameters, the optimal choice of m, the maximized profit, input utilization 
and TFPQ are given by the values in Table A14 below: 
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Table A14. Numerical example: New entrant, low- and high-ability incumbents 
 
  New entrant Low-ability incumbent High-ability incumbent 
Time managing production 0.94 1.28 1.53 
Total input 1.50 1.83 2.58 
Input utilization 0.69 0.80 0.87 
TFPQ 1.03 0.80 0.87 
Profit 1.68 1.68 3.33 
Profit/total input 1.12 0.92 1.29 
 
 As can be seen from Table A14, high-ability incumbent’s profit is double the profit of 
both new entrant and low-ability incumbent, but his plant’s TFPQ is lower than that of a new 
entrant. Input utilization is the lowest for a new entrant, higher for a low-ability incumbent, and 
the highest for the high-ability incumbent. These are exactly the patterns we saw in the data. 
What happens after a high-ability incumbent acquires a new entrant or a low-ability 
incumbent in the setup above? Recalculating optimal m using acquirer’s ability level, 𝛾 = 3.5 
yields the changes presented in Table A-15 below. 
 
Table A15. Numerical example:  
New entrant and low-ability incumbent from before to after acquisition by a high-ability 
incumbent 
 











production 0.94 1.25 1.28 1.53 
Total input 1.50 2.41 1.83 2.58 
Input utilization 0.69 0.79 0.80 0.87 
TFPQ 1.03 1.18 0.80 0.87 
Profit 1.68 4.35 1.68 3.33 
Profit/total input 1.12 1.81 0.92 1.29 
 
 Under the new, more capable ownership, plants of both new entrants and low-ability 
incumbents improve input utilization and TFPQ. Profits jump by even more––they double for the 
low-ability incumbent plant from before to after acquisition, and increase 2.6 times for the plant 
formerly owned by a new entrant. Even when normalized by total input, the profit rate improves 




K. Year-by-year estimates of acquired plants’ TFPQ changes before and after acquisition events 
and within-acquisition comparisons between incumbent and acquired plants 
We first present here the results of estimating an equation similar to (1) in the main text 
but with the full set of pre- and post-acquisition time dummies, so that as to see both pre- and 
post-acquisition time trends. The estimation equation is: 
,      (A.7) 
where T is the year of acquisition, and Di- and Di+ are the dummies equal to 1 for plant i in years 
up to 4 years prior to the acquisition year and zero otherwise, and equal to 1 for plant i in years 6 
and beyond after the acquisition and zero otherwise, respectively.  The estimates are carried out 
using observations on all productive establishments that changed ownership between 1898 and 
1920. 
 
Figure A7. Within-acquired plants changes in TFPQ from before to after acquisition 
 
 
 Figure A7 presents the coefficients on the dummies from the equation (A.7) along with 
the 95 percent confidence intervals (the omitted year is the year of acquisition). Consistent with 
the results in Table 2 in the main text, the TFPQ of acquired plants are statistically and 
economically indistinguishable from zero during the pre-acquisition period. After acquisitions, 
TFPQ starts improving, gradually in the first 3 years and then plateaus after the fourth year at 
around 0.12-0.14. 
We also estimated a regression similar to the “difference-in-difference” regression (2) in 
the main text, also with a full set of time dummies: 
 𝑦�𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑐𝚤𝑠������8𝑡=𝑇−4,𝑡≠𝑜 + ∑ 𝛽𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑖𝑠8𝑡=𝑇−4 + 𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,   (A.8) 
where, as in the main text, 𝑦�𝑖𝑡 is TFPQ (relative to industry-year average) of plant i at time t if it 
is an acquired plant, while TFPQs (also relative to industry-year average) of incumbent plants are 
collapsed to 𝑦�𝑖𝑡 = 1#𝑚𝐴 ∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑡𝑗∈𝑚𝐴 , where 𝑚𝐴  denotes the particular acquisition case in which 
plant i was acquired and #𝑚𝐴 is the number of incumbent plants in acquisition 𝑚𝐴. The timeline 
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Figure A8. Within-acquisition TFPQ of acquired and incumbent plants  
 
 
Figure A8 presents the coefficients on the dummies from the equation (A.8), along with 
the 95 percent confidence intervals. (The omitted category is TFPQ of incumbent plants in the 
year of acquisition, so all other variables are measured relative to the incumbent plants’ average 
TFPQ in the acquisition year.) Consistent with the results in Table 3 in the main text, TFPQ of 
acquired plants is somewhat higher than TFPQ of incumbent plants before acquisition, but the 
difference is not statistically significant. There is no particularly pronounced trend in incumbent 
plants’ TFPQ both before and after acquisitions, but acquired plants clearly diverge upward from 
incumbent plants (and the rest of the industry––recall that TFPQ are the residuals from 
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